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Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

Despite intense domestic challenges, debate, and controversy, it is important not to lose sight of the outside world. It can be easy, in a domestic environment that is very eye-catching, to forget the world and all of its intricacies. As is shown by the recent invasion of Ukraine, history is far from its end and much more research on it needs to be done. Probing into this diverse and confusing world is the prime mission of the Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy (CJFP). For a decade, we have scoured the undergraduate world for the best ideas about our international past, present, and future. Our hope is that this most recent edition lives up to this high ideal. This edition of the journal focuses on a diverse set of broad issues, including polarity, migration, neoliberalism, socialism, and more. In a world beset by a constant barrage of crises, the need for new minds to engage with these issues is paramount. These authors have, unprompted and without limitations to style, sent in their work to us in order to share their unique voice and perspective with you. Hopefully, the articles enclosed in this journal will enrich our reader's minds, ignite debate, and serve as the first step to long and successful journeys for our authors, editors, and readers. We thank you for reading this edition of the CJFP.

Sincerely,
Thomas Weil
Editor-in-Chief, Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy

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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period- The Antithesis of Isolationism

by Stephanie Glascock
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American history aficionados and foreign policy gurus have routinely fixated on the 1920s and 1930s as the hallmark of American isolationism, pinpointing the interwar period as the epitome of this country turning inwards in its foreign policy. As tempting as it may be to fall victim to this trap, foreign policy pundits must understand that isolationism fails to describe the internationalist impulse of the twenties, embodied in the policy of involvement without commitment, and the divergence from the conventional strategy of neutrality.

The conventional notion that the U.S. was isolationist during the 1920s fundamentally misunderstands the very nature of foreign policy during the decade. Classifying the U.S. as isolationist implies that it sought to hide in the shadows following World War I (WWI). It suggests that Americans “had been forced against their will into the limelight of global affairs,”¹ that any international action taken during this period was reluctantly pursued. However, rather than shy away from internationalism in the wake of WWI, the U.S. purposefully capitalized on its aftermath to expand its power throughout the world. In fact, the geopolitical context of the 1920s gifted the U.S. with momentary reinstatement of free security which the nation historically enjoyed prior to the war, providing the conditions for the U.S. to expand its international presence. The favorable balance of power in Europe was restored following the military collapse of the Central powers, decline in Russian power following the end of the Tsarist empire,² and total war devastation which exhausted the military capability of the victorious European powers.³ In turn, the U.S. faced no major security threats emanating from the European continent during this decade. Similarly, such widespread destruction experienced by the former great

¹ Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality,” 347.

² Higuchi, “Isolationism: The Atlantic World.”

³ Braeman, “Power and Diplomacy,” 348.

powers also devastated any competing economy, which enabled the United States to become the world’s leading creditor and world’s strongest economic power.⁴ This new economic might in the absence of major security threats laid the foundation for the foreign policy of the roaring twenties.

Aspiring to maximize this golden opportunity, the U.S. in the 1920s shifted to a foreign policy doctrine of involvement without commitment to promote its interests abroad. Although American policymakers did indeed limit participation in various arenas of formal international affairs in the immediate aftermath of the war, most notably refusing to join the League of Nations and World Court, they simultaneously “vigorously promoted [U.S.] interests while scrupulously guarding against entanglements.”⁵ In doing so, the U.S. by no means retracted from its world responsibilities as a great power, contrary to the narrative furthered by isolationist proponents,⁶ but expanded its involvement abroad while maintaining officially neutral positions. This strategy operated through a two-pronged approach to international affairs through corporate relationships and negative security alliances. The first prong utilized businessmen, economists, and bankers, such as Illinois banker Charles Dawes and businessman Owen D. Young, as unofficial agents in directing negotiations with other nations to prioritize American capital. This reliance on private actors over public servants inextricably linked economic expansion and corporate goals to 1920s foreign policy directives. On the other hand, diplomats actively sought arms control and reduction through non-binding multilateral agreements.⁷ These contracts acted as negative security alliances, committing the U.S. and other contracting parties to not expand their military capabilities. In this way, the dominant approach of the foreign policy in the 1920s actively pursued involvement with the rest of the world for its own economic promotion and military security, contrary to the implications of the isolationist narrative.

By utilizing involvement without commitment, the U.S. routinely took a leading role

⁴ Eckes and Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, 60.

⁵ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 436.

⁶ Madar, “Ostrich America?” December 14, 2010.

⁷ Higuchi, “Isolationism: The Atlantic World.”

in altering international geopolitics, as evident in resolving the post war economic crisis that plagued Europe. While no major military apparatuses posed a serious threat to security, Republicans recognized that the shambles of European economics, particularly Germany's debt, created an economic and political source of instability that required decisive and gallant action to avoid economic chaos. Consequently, foreign policymakers partnered with the New York banking community to revive private capital flows and nurture financial markets to strengthen American economic independence and commercial gain. Specifically, the banking community, represented by Dawes and Young, worked hand in hand with the House of Morgan to provide currency stabilization to Germany in the Dawes Plan of 1924 which ended the Allied occupation, reduced the number of reparations, required the Allied Powers to buy German products, provided a \$200 million loan to Germany, and appointed an American as an overseer of all payments pertinent to the act.⁸ This plan not only restored economic stability to Germany in the years following, but it also represented "the beginning of a secure and enduring peace,"⁹ piloted by the U.S. This economic deal thus symbolized the U.S.'s internationalist drive for economic expansion and peace promotion throughout the twenties.

Foreign policy directed towards Asia reflected similar trends as the Republican administrations furthered neutrality rights, consequently securing a leadership role in promoting stability in the Pacific. The attention of policymakers in the Asian theater in the decade following WWI was directed not towards maximizing the revived balance of power, as was the case in the European context, but reestablishing it. Specifically, the increasingly friendly Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperialism in China, and armament escalation by East Asian powers directly threatened the favorable conditions that had previously allowed the U.S. to reap economic benefits from China and be free from threat on the Pacific front.¹⁰ Subsequently, embarking on a quest to maximize collective security outside of the League, American diplomats promoted

⁸ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States.*

⁹ Coolidge, "President Coolidge's Speech."

¹⁰ Cohen, "America's Response to China," 94.

negative security alliances in the hallmark arms reduction agreement at the 1921 Washington Conference. The initial Four Power Treaty among the U.S., Japan, Britain, and France dissolved the Anglo-Japanese alliance and enshrined a commitment to territorial integrity of the parties' possessions in the Pacific in the name of the "preservation of the general peace."¹¹ Similarly, the Nine Power Treaty, which was purposefully crafted to stabilize great power conflict in China, formally recognized Chinese territorial sovereignty and committed the contracting powers not to seek "any general superiority"¹² in economic development in the region. In doing so, it officialized the historically favorable Open Door principle in China internationally, stabilized a potentially dangerous arms race, and unequivocally demonstrated that the U.S. was assuming a role as an international leader. As such, the Washington Convention's negative security alliances reflected the internationalist impulse of 1920s America in search for the maximization of economic prosperity and national security.

While it is factually inaccurate to portray the twenties as isolationist, there is a sensible argument to label the thirties as such as long as that term is solely used to purport a hesitancy to formally align with Europe.¹³ It is true that the economic crisis spurred by the Great Depression reduced support among the American public for sending aid internationally¹⁴ and the mounting threat of war altered the favorable security conditions afforded throughout the twenties.¹⁵ Hence, most Americans indeed "preferred to concentrate on domestic issues, shun international cooperation, retain complete freedom of action, and avoid war at virtually any cost,"¹⁶ and thus favored limited participation in international affairs as implied by isolationism. However, it is necessary to remember that these isolationist inclinations were "not about keeping the United States out of the world,"¹⁷ but were rather "about keeping it out of war."¹⁸ As such, 1930s foreign

¹¹ "The Four-Power Treaty."

¹² "The Nine-Power Treaty."

¹³ Blower, "From Isolationism to Neutrality," 346.

¹⁴ Blower, "From Isolationism to Neutrality," 346.

¹⁵ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 502.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Blower, "From Isolationism to Neutrality," 351.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

policy *could* be described as isolationist if such reference was made solely regarding war.

Nevertheless, the implications of conventional isolationism do a disservice to the shifts in foreign policy that took place as a result of changing security patterns throughout the thirties. Specifically, the U.S. finally departed from its strategy of neutrality in order to avoid war and promote national self-interest.¹⁹ Convinced that traditional neutrality was no longer feasible or desirable given the scale of the first world war and the devastation of the Great Depression, politicians and the American public alike were confronted with the fact international relations no longer espoused the “passive neutrality of other days.”²⁰ Despite the attempt to resuscitate neutrality through the initial implementation of the Neutrality Acts of 1935, which asserted the traditional ban on belligerent alignment and prohibited the sale of arms to belligerents,²¹ neutrality evidently did not survive as the U.S. found itself increasingly at cross hairs with combating fascist aggression and supporting Great Britain and France. Given this insufficiency of neutrality, President Roosevelt (FDR) proposed to “quarantine” aggressors, namely Japan, as the interdependence of the modern world made “it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself.”²² In doing so, FDR deliberately and inextricably linked domestic peace to global security, contending that neutrality could no longer protect Americans if international relations continued to disintegrate. It had thus become accepted among public and politicians alike that isolationism and strategic neutrality were not the path forward if the U.S. wanted to maintain any semblance of peace.

Policymakers consequently embarked on the endeavor to curtail the outbreak of war, contrary to the notion that the U.S. was enmeshed with solely domestic matters and ignored the realities of the escalating geopolitical situation.²³ In response to the peril posed by the failure of the strategy of neutrality, FDR purposefully looked to alternative policy mechanisms

¹⁹ Thompson, “Conceptions of National Security,” 672.

²⁰ Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality,” 369.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Roosevelt, “President Franklin D. Roosevelt Proposes to ‘Quarantine’ Aggressors.”

²³ In his piece, Madar claims that the U.S. was “jitterbugging on the sidelines” in the period leading up to World War II. See Madar, “Ostrich America?” December 14, 2010.

to prevent the world from spiraling into the fiery pits of hell. In 1940, recognizing that a war initially constrained to European and East Asian borders had developed “into a world war for domination”²⁴ which no longer afforded the U.S. free security, FDR altered the strategy of neutrality. In promoting the Lend-Lease bill, which enabled the “[sale], transfer, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise [disposal] of’ any ‘war material’ to any nation whose defense was deemed vital to the defense of the United States,”²⁵ FDR framed the U.S.’s defense as contingent on the future of Britain²⁶ given the precarious state of its economy. This direct provision of resources to a belligerent not only abandoned the decades old policy of neutrality but also shed its last standing pretense.²⁷ Thus, the U.S. strategically modified its foreign policy strategy in the 1930s and early 1940s to promote peace rather than recoil from the mounting threat of war.

Similarly, the U.S. purposefully sought to extinguish the fomenting tensions in Asia. Although the Washington System evidently stabilized East Asia during the twenties,²⁸ the 1931-1932 Manchurian crisis, the 1937 Sino-Japanese War, and Japan’s formal rejection of the Washington System showcased Japan’s increasingly imperialist aggression and dismantled the negative security alliance regime.²⁹ Recognizing that this deterioration of the prior decade’s peaceful conditions threatened “the very foundations of civilization”³⁰ and was emblematic of “a program of predatory imperialism,”³¹ American politicians agreed that the situation necessitated a different approach to foreign policy. Consequently, FDR strategically advocated for the aforementioned “quarantine” of Japan to eliminate avenues to engrossment in war. Through the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed with Japan³² and adaptation of an embargo on gas and iron³³ against the Land of the Rising Sun, this quarantine sought to

²⁴ Roosevelt, “Radio Address Announcing an Unlimited National Emergency.”

²⁵ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 525.

²⁶ Roosevelt, “Press Conference on Lend-Lease Policy.”

²⁷ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 525.

²⁸ Iriye, “Clash of Systems,” 134.

²⁹ Hunt, “The Road to Pearl Harbor,” 61.

³⁰ Roosevelt, “President Franklin D. Roosevelt Proposes to ‘Quarantine’ Aggressors.”

³¹ Hornbeck, “Stanley K. Hornbeck Urges Economic Sanctions Against Japan.”

³² Iriye, “Clash of Systems,” 138.

³³ Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 531.

isolate Japan from the support of the international community to avoid escalation to armed conflict.³⁴ The response to Japanese aggression in the thirties thus inaugurated “a new era when Americans would make liberal use of sanctions and other short-of-war forms of coercion to impact the policies and conflicts of others,”³⁵ heralding a foreign policy set on protecting U.S. security through actively engaging with the world.

As these measures proved ineffective in squashing Japanese ambitions, the U.S. became increasingly aggressive and defensive, contrary to the isolationist perception that Pearl Harbor proved the U.S. was unprepared for Japanese aggression. At a rhetorical level, FDR passionately declared following the Japanese signing of the Tripartite Pact that “when your enemy comes at you in a tank or a bombing plane, if you hold your fire until you see the whites of his eyes, you will never know what hit you,”³⁶ demonstrating an intense internalization of the Japanese threat. Tangibly, such jingoistic rhetoric translated to an expansion of the embargo against Japan,³⁷ a policy of containment,³⁸ the buildup of the navy,³⁹ and the placement of the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor to visibly and forcefully remind “Tokyo of the steel and power behind U.S. policy.”⁴⁰ The U.S. hence amped up its preparation for war as its diplomatic measures crumpled. While such preparation evidently did not prevent Pearl Harbor, detailed investigations have revealed that American intelligence on December 7th was at fault for the attack as officers lacked the precision to determine where the strike would take place.⁴¹ Thus, using Pearl Harbor to portray the U.S. as militarily unprepared in the buildup to war neglects recognition of the widespread measures taken to amplify defense and the mistakes of the intelligence community.

Isolationism was not the guiding rationale for interwar foreign policy. The twenties were spurred by internationalism in the form of involvement without commitment and the thirties

34 Hornbeck, “Stanley K. Hornbeck Urges,” 1938.

35 Blower, “From Isolationism to Neutrality,” 369.

36 Roosevelt, “Radio Address Announcing an Unlimited National Emergency.”

37 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 531.

38 Roosevelt, “Cable to Winston S. Churchill.”

39 Hunt, “The Road to Pearl Harbor,” 66-67.

40 Ibid., 67.

41 Ibid., 71.

deviated from long enshrined neutrality strategies to increase interaction with the world. This period thus cannot be said to be the epitome of isolationism as purported by the mainstream narrative. That begs the question, if this era, so widely known for its isolationist inclinations, was not actually isolationist, is this term apt to describe U.S. policy at all? The historically correct answer would be no. It is apparent when carefully examining American history that the typical characterization of an isolationist approach to foreign affairs was rather a calculated strategy of engagement that sought to maximize power. Washington’s hesitancy to enter entangling alliances was indeed integrated as a fundamental component of foreign policy, but the U.S. has always consistently engaged with foreign powers. From leveraging neutrality and war against France to gain the Louisiana territory,⁴² establishing economic conditions favorable to the U.S. in China starting in the 1840s,⁴³ assuming the role of an international police power,⁴⁴ and later attempting to create a new world order,⁴⁵ the U.S. has never buried its head in the sand but always purposefully sought to expand its role in the world. The interwar period’s invitation to reassess the history of American politics hence encourages us to challenge the conventional narratives that America’s foreign policy has been isolationist by any means.

42 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 104.

43 Keliher, “Anglo-American Rivalry and the Origins of U.S. China Policy,” 228.

44 Roosevelt, “The Roosevelt Corollary.”

45 Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 399.

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Down but Never out: The Asymptotic Decline of the Post-Cold War U.S.

Empire

A Comprehensive Historical Analysis
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In a letter dated August 15th, 1786, President George Washington wrote that “However unimportant America may be considered at present [...], there will assuredly come a day when this country will have some weight in the scale of Empires.”¹ At the end of the First World War, the U.S. asserted itself among the giants of international relations. By the end of the Second World War, it stood firmly in an ideologically bipolar order. Finally, as the Iron Curtain fell, the U.S. seemed to achieve its long-awaited unipolar moment. At the outset of the post-Cold War world, the U.S. had matched the scale of empires and epitomized its definition. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War era unveiled the U.S. as a victim of its own actions and of emerging hegemonic forces. Therefore, the following essay argues that the post-Cold War United States is an unforeseen imperial actor whose decline from unipolarity emerged through foreign policy failures and domestic divisions. At the same time, China and Russia pushed the empire into multipolarity. Nevertheless, while the U.S. empire may have fallen short on its global policing efforts, the strength of its uniqueness allows it to escape irrelevance.

The decline of the U.S. power begins with its composition as an empire and its uniquely American goals for imperial hegemony. Labelling the U.S. as an empire is a contentious proposition. Article IV Section IV of the U.S. Constitution denotes the nation as a Republic;² therefore, labels of empire fall beyond the scope of the nation’s founding principles. Moreover, the nature of

1 “From George Washington to Lafayette, 15 August 1786,” *National Archives*, accessed March 16, 2021, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0200>.

2 “The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription,” *National Archives*, accessed March 16, 2021, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript>.

imperialism implies something unwanted and forced.³ Since American identity deems freedom imperative, the term empire may not fit well within this context. Nevertheless, by spreading these values abroad, the post-Cold War U.S. ‘empire’ positions itself as a beacon of democracy. It utilizes an inescapable wave of economics, mass media, tourists, businesspeople, scholars, and other agents of dissemination to spread Americanism abroad.⁴ For those who conform, the U.S. empire disperses these American values through the aforementioned mechanisms. For those who do not conform, American ideas are advanced through alternative means.

The U.S. empire’s primary mechanism for spreading freedom resides in its global policeman complex. Amidst the American unipolar moment, the empire sought to legitimize itself in regions opposed to the immediate dissemination of American values. However, through the insistence of the “United States as a global policeman tasked with upholding international norms,”⁵ the empire weakened its potential to solidify hegemony. As the following examples unveil, those who rejected the U.S.’ imperial values were subject to a forceful global policeman who suffered from a declining reputation at home and abroad. The desire to spread freedom elsewhere inadvertently became an ironic conduit for the empire’s decline.

Beginning with President Bill Clinton, a foreign policy disaster in Somalia showcased the U.S. empire as unfit for its unipolar moment. Promising to act “with peaceful diplomacy when ever possible, with force when necessary,”⁶ Clinton’s response to Somalia represented the latter. In May 1993, the Clinton administration deployed 5000 U.S. troops alongside the United Nations Operation Somalia.⁷ The original intent for this U.N. operation was a humanitarian mission designed to rescue

3 Frank A. Ninkovich, *The global republic: America’s inadvertent rise to world power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 227, <https://doi.org/10.7208/9780226173337>.

4 Ninkovich, *The global republic*, 226.

5 Scott Laderman, “Camouflaging Empire: Imperial Benevolence in American Popular Culture,” in *Imperial benevolence: U.S. foreign policy and American popular culture since 9/11*, eds. Tim Gruenewald and Scott Laderman (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 5, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?13004805>.

6 William J. Clinton, “First Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1993), *The Avalon Project*, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/clinton1.asp.

7 Thomas H. Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 94, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1007/978-3-319-48640-6>.

a famished Somalian population.⁸ However, in keeping up with the imperial impetus, “Washington officials saw [this mission] as a project of nation building in Somalia.”⁹ This broadened political agenda prompted the Clinton administration to mobilize the U.S. troops in Mogadishu and attempt to capture Mohamed Farrah Aidid, a chief architect of the opposing United Somali Congress.¹⁰ The infamous Black Hawk down incident left 18 Americans dead and 73 wounded.¹¹ Thus, in an attempt to showcase imperial unipolarity, the U.S. empire seemingly overstepped its boundaries and subjected itself to international criticism. What began as benevolent humanitarianism became a failure for the U.S. empire to create an ally and instill democracy. Nevertheless, presenting an early crack in the post-Cold War imperial edifice.

The domestic reaction to Somalia prevented the empire from coalescing unipolarity in future instances. As a blemish on the administration’s record, the events in Mogadishu prompted Clinton to say, “we have obligations elsewhere.”¹² With the American public pressuring for Clinton to avoid foreign crises and turn his attention to the problems at home,¹³ the administration looked weak once the genocide in Rwanda unfolded. The 1994 Rwandan genocide became a 100-day massacre between the Hutu and Tutsi native populations. Although the Clinton administration internally debated its options, the “shadow of Somalia hung over the deliberations.”¹⁴ Rwandan non-intervention represented the empire’s domestic polity limiting the Clinton administration from undertaking imperial unipolarity. Since the misstep in Somalia brought fear into Congress and the public’s heart, the chance to salvage the empire’s reputation was squandered anew, albeit this time, from within.

8 Timothy J. Lynch, *In the shadow of the Cold War: American foreign policy from George Bush Sr. to Donald Trump* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 61, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/de-tails?13142772&uuid=a0573f7c-1610-471f-b908-5ca77d0a3ada>.

9 Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy*, 94.

10 Ibid., 95.

11 Ibid., 93-95.

12 William J. Clinton, interview by Roger Mudd, and Margaret Warner, *The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour*, NewsHour Productions, October 18, 1993, https://americanarchive.org/catalog/cpb-aacip_507-qr4nk3715b.

13 Cathinka Vik, *Moral Responsibility, Statecraft, and Humanitarian Intervention* (London: Routledge, 2015), 35, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.4324/9781315713762>.

14 Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy*, 99.

George W. Bush’s failure in Iraq represented the seminal post-Cold War event that tarnished the empire’s unipolar moment. Beginning after 9/11, President Bush spoke of freedom in a messianic manner.¹⁵ This powerful language not only foreshadowed intransigent militaristic retaliation, but also represented Bush’s desire to reshape global politics. Thus, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 became an opportunity to take down a dictator in the name of freedom. However, this empty promise was far from the reality. The U.S. went to war “with no carefully drawn up roadmap for the day after Saddam Hussein fell from power.”¹⁶ Moreover, the Bush administration’s search for allies resulted in international skepticism and staunch opposition. The U.S. empire would end up fighting a costly war whilst earning condemnation from afar. By the time Bush left office in 2009, Iraq had descended into a brutal civil war.¹⁷ Thus, these failures presented a glaring irony to the U.S. empire. Premising the war on the pretext that “Iraqi lives and freedom matter greatly to [America],”¹⁸ the U.S. merely left Iraq in a state of civil war. Not only was Bush’s policing detrimental for Iraq, but American unipolarity lost significant clout. Moreover, the fact that the U.S. needed international legitimation implied an empire whose unquestioned unipolarity was already under scrutiny. The empire’s attempt at legitimacy was simply an unconvincing method to cultivate its hegemony. Therefore, the global policeman complex only accelerated this growing decline.

The discord over Iraq between the American polity and Congressional leadership was indicative of a fracture inside the empire’s edifice. Although both sides initially supported bringing freedom “to such a benighted land,”¹⁹ the American people became less convinced as time passed. The reality was that Congress and the White House’s attempted justification dissolved over time.

15 John Callaghan, Brendon O’Connor, and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2019), 155, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.4324/9780429019241>.

16 Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy*, 191.

17 Ibid., 210.

18 George W. Bush, “Speech to the American Enterprise Institute” (speech, Washington, D.C., February 26, 2003), *Teaching American History*, <https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-to-the-american-enterprise-institute/>.

19 Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy*, 209.

With no evidence of W.M.D.'s and a growing sense that American troops were not coming home,²⁰ Americans began to purport that “Bush lied, people died.”²¹ This damning allegation reflected poorly on both Bush and the Congressional leaders. Seen as out-of-touch with the American polity, the fracturing from within delegitimized the empire on a second front. Not only did the war look foolish abroad, but the American people began to lose faith in their leadership.

President Barack Obama's foreign policy record was arguably less egregious than his Republican predecessor. However, eerily similar to Bush and Iraq, Libya's political vacuum emerged from the same global policeman complex. In March 2011, President Obama spoke to the American people claiming that Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi had “denied his people freedom.”²² In the same month, a joint NATO mission successfully overthrew Ghaddafi.²³ However, once Gaddafi acquiesced, the post-Gaddafi legacy reflected poorly on the U.S. empire. Libya tumbled into civil war, and the political vacuum resulted in numerous rival militias confronting the de facto government.²⁴ The lawlessness that ensued in Libya also made it a security threat that was vulnerable to Islamist extremism.²⁵ Once again, the empire's belief in the universality of freedom caused it to enact its global policeman complex, even if it did not comprehend Libya's complex history. When using the vehicle of policing to impose such freedoms abroad, the results proved counterproductive. Although successful in the short run, Obama's inability to consolidate power and bring freedom to the Libyan people was emblematic of imperial decline. The cyclical creation of power vacuums did not bode well for U.S. reputation. Thus, Libya represents another significant limitation to the outreach of the U.S. empire.

²⁰ Ibid., 201-202.

²¹ Lynch, *In the shadow*, 145.

²² Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya” (speech, Washington, D.C., March 28, 2011), *Obama White House Archives*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.

²³ David Fitzgerald, and David Ryan, *Obama, US Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 102, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1057/9781137428561>.

²⁴ Luiz Alberto, and Moniz Bandeira, *The World Disorder: US Hegemony, Proxy Wars, Terrorism and Humanitarian Catastrophes* (Cham: Springer, 2019), 101, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1007/978-3-030-03204-3>.

²⁵ Alberto, and Bandeira, *The World Disorder*, 101.

At home, Libya's legacy was most destructive after the attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on September 11th, 2012. Notedly, domestic polarization was nothing new to American politics. But the death of four American officials became so acrimonious that a Select Committee on Benghazi in the U.S. House of Representatives began to investigate the White House.²⁶ The Republicans torched the government, claiming that it did not maximize its effort to prevent the attack or rescue the besieged victims.²⁷ With political opposition premised on attacking the president, the goal of domestic politics changed. Benghazi reflected a domestic polity that opposed one another for the sole sake of opposition. For Not only was opposition garnered from abroad, but the unity of American politics also degenerated into a deplorable state of unnecessary conflict. The legacy of Libya proved equally detrimental for both Obama and the empire.

President Donald Trump's foreign policy decisions represented a fundamental shift in U.S. imperialism. Yet, similar to past administrations, the decisions still fostered imperial decline. Whereas past Presidents tried to impose the global policeman complex to maximize the U.S.'s unipolar moment, the Trump administration wholly rejected this ideology. Instead, Trump's decisions in northeastern Syria in 2019 reflected a microcosm of his administration's contribution to decline. To “get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars,”²⁸ President Trump withdrew most U.S. troops from northeastern Syria, leaving the Kurdish people without a primary ally.²⁹ As an ethnic group struggling to obtain official independence, the President forced the Kurdish forces to seek allyship from the Russian-backed Syrian government.³⁰ Moreover, from the outside, Trump's decision was met with sharp criticism from fellow European allies.³¹ By creating this power vacuum, President Trump accelerated imperial decline in two ways. Firstly, by rejecting the global

²⁶ Henriksen, *Cycles in US Foreign Policy*, 270.

²⁷ Ibid., 269.

²⁸ Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “The Kurds fought with us, but were paid massive amounts of money and equipment to do so. They have been fighting Turkey for decades. I held off this fight for,” Tweet, October 7, 2019.

²⁹ Jean Galbraith, “United States Withdraws Troops from Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable,” *The American Journal of International Law* 114, no. 1 (January 2020): 143, <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2019.81>.

³⁰ Galbraith, “United States Withdraws Troops,” 143.

³¹ Ibid., 144.

policeman complex, the empire's foreign policy reflected a new opposition to unipolarity. Instead of enforcing freedom abroad, Trump's worldview looked inward. Secondly, the condemnation from fellow allies depicted an empire delegitimized as the unipolar hegemon. Although past administrations experienced decline by overemphasizing the global policeman complex, the Trump administration ironically suffered by rejecting the complex altogether.

The domestic response to President Trump's withdrawal of troops in northeastern Syria revealed an overarching identity crisis permeating throughout the Trump administration. During a rare moment of bipartisanship, both Republicans and Democrats questioned Trump's intentions in Syria.³² Meanwhile, the President stood staunchly by his decision. President Trump campaigned "on the fact that [he] was going to bring [U.S.] soldiers home,"³³ but many in Washington approached this decision differently. Former ambassador Nikki Haley urged a need to "always have the backs of [their] allies."³⁴ By espousing the global policeman rhetoric, Haley's comments highlighted an American polity unsure of its leadership and role in the world. Moreover, Haley reflected the sentiment of Americans who still favoured the policeman complex. With a president determined to re-order traditional foreign policy, the lack of domestic consensus did not bode well for unipolarity. The combatting visions of foreign policy ultimately revealed a domestic polity whose vision for the empire was largely undecided.

The end of the Cold War was supposed to represent an uncontested opportunity for U.S. leadership and neoliberal economic consensus. Instead, China's rapid economic rise propelled the U.S. into a multipolar framework. Under both Clinton and Bush, China was an ambivalent threat that did not require immediate foreign policy attention.³⁵ Clinton mimicked Nixon by believing

³² Mehmet Gurses, "The Evolving Kurdish Question in Turkey," *Middle East Critique* 29, no. 3 (2020): 312, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1770448>.

³³ Donald J. Trump, interview by George Stephanopoulos, *This Week*, ABC News, March 27, 2016, <https://abc-news.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-donald-trump-sen-bernie-sanders/story?id=37949498>.

³⁴ Nikki Haley (@NikkiHaley), "We must always have the backs of our allies, if we expect them to have our back. The Kurds were instrumental in our successful fight against ISIS in Syria," Tweet, October 7, 2019, <https://twitter.com/NikkiHaley/status/1181191973367160834>.

³⁵ Lynch, *In the shadow*, 149.

that economic openness would entrench democracy and subdue Chinese power.³⁶ Likewise, Bush dittoed Nixon by identifying Islam as a common fear to warm relations with China.³⁷ While the U.S. blissfully ignored China's capacity for growth, by the late 2000s, China became too powerful to ignore. By 2010, China overtook Japan to become the world's second-largest economy.³⁸ In 2013, China displaced the US as the world's leading industrial producer.³⁹ Between the beginning and end of Obama's tenure in office, the Chinese economy tripled in size while the U.S. economy only grew by 20 percent.⁴⁰ This relative decline under Obama implied a loss of leverage "to bind countries across the developing world to [U.S.] strategic priorities."⁴¹ No longer was the guise of neoliberalism wholly appealing; instead, the successful Chinese model pushed the worldview away from a unipolar economic system. Under Trump, the policy vis-à-vis China was characterized by a 'tough on China' rhetoric. In 2018, the Trump administration imposed punitive tariffs and restrictions on Chinese investments.⁴² Nevertheless, economist Yew-Kwang Ng noted that Trump's engagement in a trade war was not only mutually harmful but it "actually hurts America more than China."⁴³ Although Trump attempted to strengthen unipolarity in the face of adversity, his policies failed to reflect such bravado. China's recent rise depicts a foreign actor whose influence will only grow in the long-term. Regardless of if or when China overtakes the U.S. in economic superiority, the world order has already begun its transformation into permanent multipolarity. Through U.S. relative decline and Chinese economic rise, the U.S. empire lost its hegemonic advantage.

The second major player pushing the U.S. empire into multipolarity is the post-Cold War Russian Federation. Vis-à-vis the U.S. empire, Russia developed a military hegemon with

³⁶ Ibid., 89.

³⁷ Ibid., 149.

³⁸ Jude Woodward, *The US vs China: Asia's new Cold War?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 3.

³⁹ Woodward, *The US vs China*, 3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

⁴² Richard Javad Heydarian, *The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 38, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1007/978-981-13-9799-8>.

⁴³ Yew-Kwang Ng, "Why Does the US Face Greater Disadvantages in the Trade War with China?" *China & World Economy* 28, no. 2 (2020): 113, <https://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12323>.

nationalistic fervour. Contrary to Clinton's naïve anticipation, the Russian government recognized that a blind acceptance of liberal democracy would come at the expense of its domestic security.⁴⁴ Under Bush, in 2008, the former Russian territory of Georgia was invaded after electing a pro-Western leader.⁴⁵ For Russian President Dimitri Medvedev, however, the aim was to protect the lives of his citizens, wherever they may be.⁴⁶ Thus, revealing a Russian empire unwilling to yield its power to NATO and Western interests. Russian nationalism over Georgia also reflected an empire eerily similar to its Cold War self. Hence, once Obama tried flexing his power, Russian aggression multiplied. In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea under the pretext of defending an oppressed ethnic minority in Ukraine.⁴⁷ In a speech addressing the Russian Duma, Putin claimed that "Crimean Tatars [have] returned to their homeland."⁴⁸ Essentially, Putin justified imperialism in the name of nationalism. Meanwhile, Obama stood by and failed to demonstrate legitimate strength. Under Trump, the re-emerging Russian empire obtained its full legitimation. Before his election, Trump frightened allies by rendering NATO obsolete.⁴⁹ Once assuming office, he implied that the U.S. should lift sanctions on Russia, asking, "why would anybody have sanctions if somebody's doing some really great things?"⁵⁰ With Russian foreign policy against the West already damning, President Trump's legitimation was the final victory. Russia's trajectory in the post-Cold War era is symbolic of an empire whose resurgence displaced the U.S. empire from unipolarity. The narrative of U.S. unipolarity emerging from the Cold War was long over. Russia was steadfast at deciding its own fate through its military might and nationalistic fervour, much at the expense of U.S. hegemony.

President Joseph Biden inherited a declining empire; nevertheless, its prospects are not

⁴⁴ Lynch, *In the shadow*, 83.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴⁷ Lynch, *In the shadow*, 205.

⁴⁸ Vladimir Putin, "Address by President of the Russian Federation" (speech, Moscow, March 18, 2014), *President of Russia*, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>.

⁴⁹ David Parker, *US Foreign Policy Towards Russia in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Routledge, 2019), 233, <https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.4324/9780429452550>.

⁵⁰ Donald J. Trump, *The Wall Street Journal*, The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-sets-a-bar-for-russia-and-china-1484360380>.

dire. Victor Bulmer-Thomas notes that "the relative decline of the US economy is therefore not in dispute."⁵¹ However, the emphasis must focus on the word *relative*. Factors such as stagnating real wages and a fall in social mobility⁵² reflect poorly on the empire. Yet, the U.S. still maintains a 15% share of the global GDP,⁵³ 25% of the world's net outward foreign direct investment (FDI)⁵⁴ and is still the largest investor in research and development (R&D).⁵⁵ Likewise, "the US may be weakening, but it is still the greatest military power on the planet."⁵⁶ According to the bipartisan Peter G. Peterson Foundation, in 2020, the U.S. spent more on defence than the following ten countries combined.⁵⁷ Since 2000, the U.S. has averaged nearly 4% of its GDP towards military spending.⁵⁸ Lastly, U.S. soft-power and cosmopolitanism guarantee the longevity of the empire. Regardless of its numerous blunders abroad, the U.S. maintains a foreign policy that is omnipresent. The U.S. empire spreads through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), popular culture, corporations, social media, and the like.⁵⁹ Even as the empire's *relative* strength wanes, it will never cede to irrelevance. The U.S. empire is not only distinct because of its emphasis on delivering freedom through the global policeman complex. As the aforementioned data shows, the U.S. also differs in its ability to ensure its longevity. Regardless of its failures, the empire maintains a robust economy, military, and soft power. The combination of these forces still represents the characteristics of an empire. President Biden's responsibility now involves limiting the empire's decline as it continues its transition into multipolarity. But he should not equate the empire's decline with forthcoming obscurity. If Biden hopes to navigate this new global order, he must be prudent in his military

⁵¹ Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 275, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?12309412&uuid=9ffea2ec-a0e4-4de1-84de-62051128f6b6>.

⁵² Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat*, 276.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁵⁴ Bulmer-Thomas, *Empire in Retreat*, 282.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁵⁶ Woodward, *The US vs China*, 11.

⁵⁷ "U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING COMPARED TO OTHER COUNTRIES," *Peter G. Peterson Foundation*, accessed March 18, 2021, https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison.

⁵⁸ Woodward, *The US vs China*, 11.

⁵⁹ Penny M. Von Eschen, "Black Ops Diplomacy and the Foreign Policy of Popular Culture," in *Imperial benevolence: U.S. foreign policy and American popular culture since 9/11*, eds. Tim Gruenewald and Scott Laderman (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018), 232, <https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?13004805>.

ventures but stern against the face of opposition, notwithstanding China and Russia's rise.

The United States of America is the most unique empire of modern civilization. Fundamentally premised on the humanist value of freedom, the empire has spent much of its post-Cold War history trying to enforce these values abroad. Ironically, this desire for unipolar policing turned out to be a pillar in the empire's decline. Alongside these troubles, the respective rise of China and Russia propelled the U.S. into multipolarity. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama predicted a "Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy."⁶⁰ Twenty-nine years later, Fukuyama's hypothesis appears undeniably false. But regardless of these various forces, the empire's outlook is not destined for vanishment. President Biden will no longer be able to manoeuvre through a unipolar American moment; however, he has the resources available to maximize the empire's potential in this multipolar world. In mathematics, an asymptote represents a line approaching close to a limit but never actually making contact with such limit. The U.S. empire's decline represents this asymptotic trajectory. As the asymptote travels along the graph and towards the impending limit, the U.S. empire moves further away from unipolarity into a multipolar future. However, much like the asymptote, the U.S. empire never reaches the limit of disappearance. Uniquely positioned as an eternal hegemon, even as pressures force the empire closer to irrelevance, its capacity for sustenance limits its eventual demise.

⁶⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 48.

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We Have to Free our Country

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From 1963 to 1974, the small West African country of Guinea-Bissau fought a war for its liberation from Portuguese colonial rule. This brutal conflict came to be known as ‘Portugal’s Vietnam’ and resulted in the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, or PAIGC, winning a military victory over Portugal – one of the few nationalist armies in Africa to achieve such a feat and helping to topple the Portuguese government in the process.¹ Piero Gleijeses commented that, in 1972, Guinea-Bissau was “the only place in Africa where a guerilla movement was successfully challenging a white regime.”² How did the PAIGC’s protracted struggle with the Portuguese government prove so successful? The answer lies both in the history of Portuguese colonization and the global context of the war. The brutality of Portuguese rule readied the population for mobilization against colonial rule and made liberation through peaceful means impossible. This pushed PAIGC towards war, where their struggle benefited from the dual context of the decolonization movement and the Cold War allowing the PAIGC to draw critical support both from fellow African nationalist leaders and Communist countries. Yet, this was not a Cold War-style proxy war, as the PAIGC ensured that Guineans remained in command and that the conflict remained a war of national liberation.³ The severity of Portuguese oppression and the global contexts of decolonization and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union gave the PAIGC the domestic and international support they needed to liberate Guinea-Bissau.

Portugal’s colonization of Guinea-Bissau began in 1446, when the explorer Alvares

¹ Peter Karibe Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 57.

² Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 208.

³ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 197-199.

Fernandes began to trade with its indigenous people. Portugal claimed Guinea-Bissau but its colonial presence was limited to coastal forts and settlements as the local Guinean elite traded with them but prevented the Portuguese from expanding into the interior.⁴ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Portugal’s African colonies - Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau - existed mainly as supply ports for ships travelling to and from Portuguese colonies in Asia, such as Goa and Macau, and as a source for enslaved people to be transported to Brazil. Portugal’s colonies were mostly administered by their indigenous populations - the ethnic Portuguese presence in Guinea-Bissau was “scant in the extreme.”⁵

After Brazil gained independence in 1822, the African colonies lost much of their economic purpose but Portugal’s claims were nonetheless recognized at the Berlin Conference of 1884. Afterwards, Portugal focused on expanding its colonial control in Africa, implementing a more centralized administration. Portugal also sought to use its colonial project to build support for its government through the production of an imperial myth. With colonies in Africa, the Portuguese government could claim to stand alongside the great European powers, like Britain, France, and Germany, despite actually being much weaker than them, both in military and economic terms. The colonies became a way for Portugal to aspire to national greatness, and the government sought to encourage the people to see them that way as well. Besides that myth, Portugal also looked to their colonies as a source of economic growth following an economic crisis beginning in the 1870s.⁶ The link between the colonies and projections of Portuguese power was solidified further under the *Estado Novo*, the conservative and authoritarian regime that seized power in Portugal in 1926. António de Oliveira Salazar, a conservative law professor, joined the government soon after and rose through the ranks as Finance Minister and, briefly, as Colonial Minister. He became Prime Minister in 1932 and would lead Portugal until he fell ill

⁴ Peter Karibe Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 37.

⁵ Norrie MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire* (London: Longman, 1997), 2.

⁶ *Ibid*, 2-6.

in 1968.⁷ MacQueen argues that “the empire, twenty-two times the area of the metropole, was central to Salazar’s mission to claim for Portugal the unlikely identity of world power.”⁸

Establishing direct rule in Guinea-Bissau was not a peaceful process. Led by a Portuguese captain named Joao Teixeira Pinto, who hired a mercenary army led by a fugitive from Senegal, the campaign lasted from 1913-1915 and saw the use of mercenaries as shock troops to dominate Guinea-Bissau by burning villages in the face of heavy indigenous resistance.⁹ The Balanta people in southern Guinea-Bissau were the last people in the colony to come under direct colonial rule, which was established across Guinea-Bissau by 1915.¹⁰

Once established, the Portuguese colonial administration of Guinea-Bissau would engage in the exploitation and mistreatment of Guineans. The degree of exploitation would eventually fuel the liberation war that took hold later in the 20th century. The primary form of exploitation was a system of forced labour established by the *Estado Novo* regime. Portugal forced Guineans to build roads and other infrastructure projects and used corporal punishment when faced with indigenous resistance. In addition, the Portuguese sought to control the population by mandating they carry a passbook and requiring special permission to travel. The strict regimentation of movement meant that Guineans often could not travel on the very roads they had built. However, the Portuguese colonial system did grant a path for the people of Guinea-Bissau to gain Portuguese citizenship by allowing them to become *assimilado* (assimilated). This was a process that sought to ‘de-Africanize’ the population by requiring them to learn Portuguese and prove themselves loyal to Portugal.¹¹ Undercutting this already humiliating offer was the fact that Portugal was ruled by Salazar’s authoritarian regime who denied political freedoms even to its European citizens. Gaining citizenship would not have translated to new political rights

⁷ Ibid, 9.

⁸ Ibid, 9.

⁹ Peter Karibe Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 41.

¹⁰ Ibid, 2-6.

¹¹ Peter Karibe Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 42-5.

so few Guineans underwent the process. As Norrie McQueen noted, “the allure of ‘civilization’ was slight when its one tangible consequence was the privilege of paying extra taxes.”¹² While Portugal spoke of their duty to ‘civilize’ Guinea-Bissau, the claims were mostly rhetoric. The reality was a poor education system with few schools that promoted racist beliefs of European superiority.¹³ Colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau was humiliating and oppressive, with forced labour and efforts to ‘de-Africanize’ them reminding Guineans of their domination on a regular basis. But from the beginning, there was resistance to that domination. The fact that so many Guineans declined Portuguese citizenship clearly illustrates their strong desire to preserve their identity.

The *Estado Novo* regime was determined to quell resistance to colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, despite the colony’s marginal economic importance. The maintenance of the empire was a form of legitimacy for the *Estado Novo* regime. When faced with pressure from the United Nations to decolonize in the 1950s, the *Estado Novo* embraced a pluricontinentalist vision by declaring that Guinea-Bissau, along with Portugal’s other African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, were integral parts of Portugal, which was ‘one state single and indivisible.’¹⁴ Even at the height of the liberation struggle, there were only approximately 2000 Europeans resident in Guinea-Bissau, primarily fulfilling administrative roles.¹⁵ Yet, as the liberation movement arose, Portugal’s commitment to pluricontinentalism ensured they would not withdraw from Guinea-Bissau.

The liberation movement began in 1956 with the founding of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). PAIGC was devoted to ending Portuguese rule both in Guinea-Bissau but also in the neighbouring Cape Verde islands. The

¹² MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 12.

¹³ Peter Karibe Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 49-52.

¹⁴ Norrie MacQueen, “Portugal’s First Domino: ‘Pluricontinentalism’ and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963–1974,” *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 2 (1999): 209–11.

¹⁵ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 37.

movement's leader, Amilcar Cabral, encouraged a binational movement.¹⁶ Cabral was born in Guinea-Bissau, but his parents were from Cape Verde. He was educated in Portugal as an agronomist at the University of Lisbon, where he befriended other African students and developed an anti-colonial, Marxist ideology.¹⁷ Cabral was "the most theoretically profound of the nationalist leaders in Portuguese Africa."¹⁸ He saw decolonization as more than just political independence - it was a years-long process that necessitated a psychological struggle to free a country from colonial influences that was far larger than military victory. Cabral would carry that belief with him for the rest of his life.¹⁹

PAIGC began their struggle by focusing on strikes and direct action in cities. They formed their own union but, after it was infiltrated by Portuguese informants, chose to infiltrate the official union instead and mobilize the workers from within. When PAIGC called a strike of around 50 dock workers in August 1959, the workers were massacred by the police – this led the PAIGC to re-evaluated their strategy. They concluded that peaceful demonstrations in cities could not overcome a colonial power prepared to use deadly force against its colonial subjects. Therefore, they chose to move the struggle from the cities to the countryside and transform it from peaceful activism to an armed guerilla struggle. Recruitment in the countryside was a slow process, since the PAIGC's leadership were based in cities and Portuguese repression soon forced Cabral and his allies to organize from exile in Conakry, the capital of neighbouring Guinea, where pan-African socialist, Prime Minister Ahmed Sekou Touré had just come to power.²⁰ The PAIGC's early years show the evolving nature of the liberation campaign - initially they sought to use demonstrations and labour disruptions in cities to undermine the colonial regime and force Portugal's withdrawal. After they came to the conclusion that peaceful engagement with

16 Mustafah Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea was really set free*, (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 2003), 1-3.

17 Natalia Telepneva, "Code Name SEKRETAŘ: Amilcar Cabral, Czechoslovakia and the Role of Human Intelligence during the Cold War." *The International History Review*. 42:6 (2020), 1258.

18 MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 21.

19 Ibid, 21.

20 Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea was really set free*, 3-11.

the empire would not work, they pursued an armed struggle. They believed that armed struggle would need to be based in rural areas, even though PAIGC's leaders had little connection with those parts of Guinea-Bissau.

By January 1963, the PAIGC were ready to begin the liberation war. The PAIGC's mobilization of the countryside had especially focused on the south, notably where the Portuguese had struggled to dominate the population in the early 20th century. This history of resistance made their mobilization easier. By July, guerilla forces were attacking Portuguese garrisons and controlled large parts of Guinea-Bissau, especially in the south.²¹ The PAIGC's rapid gains forced the Portuguese army to spread out and made them vulnerable to ambushes. Portugal launched a counterattack in the south in 1964, allowing the PAIGC's forces to flee to Como Island. Once they fled to the island, Portugal sealed it off and the air force began to drop bombs and napalm on the island. They attacked the island for 75 days but failed to seize it and were finally forced to break the siege once the PAIGC opened a new eastern front to draw Portuguese forces away from the island.²² MacQueen noted that the siege of Como marked a turning point as "henceforward Portuguese strategy was based on the defence of fortified positions and the use of air power rather than any serious attempt to engage the PAIGC on the ground."²³ These strategies, including the use of napalm and the execution or forcible resettlement of villages deemed supportive of the PAIGC would soon lead the conflict to be nicknamed 'Portugal's Vietnam' as it was reminiscent of the U.S. military's strategy in Vietnam.²⁴ Cabral was a skilled diplomat, who was often in Conakry or abroad securing support for the PAIGC's efforts. Therefore, he only played a small role in military decisions. His vision was to

21 MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 37-8.

22 Mustafah Dhada, "The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered," *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 572-6.

23 MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 38.

24 Peter Karibe Mendy, "Portugal's Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1 (2003): 57.

drive the Portuguese out through attrition instead of defeating them in large battles.²⁵ By the mid 1960s, the PAIGC's military gains had slowed. They controlled around half of Guinea-Bissau, but notably controlled the border with Guinea.²⁶

The control over the border grew important as the international contexts of struggles against decolonization and the Cold War began to play a larger role in the war. The PAIGC operated out of Conakry, the capital of neighbouring Guinea, where they were offered refuge by President Ahmed Sékou Touré, who had led Guinea to independence. This refuge proved vital and Touré's support for PAIGC shows that their struggle drew strength from the decolonization movement across Africa in the mid 20th century.²⁷ But the war in Guinea-Bissau became a symbol of the fight against anti-Black racism that went beyond Africa and connected to the Civil Rights movement in the United States. It became a symbol of Black liberation that many African-Americans felt a connection to. In 1967, Black Panther leader Stokely Carmichael, later known as Kwame Touré, travelled to Conakry, where he met with Cabral and proposed that African-Americans fight alongside the PAIGC in solidarity with their connected struggles. Cabral was concerned about drawing the US into the conflict, but agreed to accept 30 soldiers. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere agreed to host the soldiers for training but these soldiers never got to Guinea-Bissau. Carmichael married a South African singer, moved to Guinea and the effort fell apart.²⁸ While Carmichael and Nyerere's involvement amounted to little, it nevertheless illustrates that the liberation of Guinea-Bissau took place within a global struggle and that context drove Sékou Touré's vital support for the PAIGC's war for liberation.

The other international context that coloured the conflict was the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Communist bloc saw Cabral as an ally and offered him support, but Cabral always prioritized decolonization above Marxism and other ideological

²⁵ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 197-8.

²⁶ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 38.

²⁷ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 186.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 193-4.

goals. Nevertheless Cabral needed weapons to fight the Portuguese and the Soviets saw a Cabral-led independent Guinea-Bissau as a potential ally. Cabral travelled to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in 1961, before the war began, where the Czechoslovak intelligence service agreed to provide him with funds, arms and training.²⁹ The Soviet Union began to provide weapons to the PAIGC in 1965, shipping hundreds of firearms along with machine guns and grenade launchers, and hosted 75 of the PAIGC's soldiers for training in Ukraine.³⁰

However, the most vital assistance came from Fidel Castro's Cuba, who established connections with the PAIGC in 1963. In 1964, Cabral met Che Guevara, who agreed to host soldiers for training in Cuba. The alliance accelerated afterwards and, when Cabral met Castro in Havana in 1966, Castro was impressed and agreed to provide doctors and military advisors. By 1967, there were 60 Cuban volunteers in Guinea-Bissau.³¹ The doctors ran hospitals in liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau, and until Guinean doctors joined them in the late 1960s, they were the main source of medical care.³² Despite Soviet aid, the Cubans were the only foreigners to fight in Guinea-Bissau and Cabral deliberately kept their numbers low throughout the conflict. PAIGC needed the Cubans to operate Soviet weaponry, especially artillery, and to train the PAIGC's fighters in its use. Even as more Guineans learned how to operate artillery, Cubans remained largely in-charge of the weapons until the end of the war.³³

Cabral accepted Communist aid but was determined to ensure that the war was a war for Guinea-Bissau's liberation led by Guineans, and not merely a Cold War proxy conflict. This connected specifically to Cabral's theories of decolonization; as he once said to another PAIGC leader, "We have to free our own country."³⁴ He feared leaving an independent Guinea-Bissau dependent on his allies, decolonized but not liberated, so he made sure that the PAIGC made its

²⁹ Natalia Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975," (Doctorate thesis, London School of Economics, 2014), 85-9.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 141-4.

³¹ *Ibid*, 186-191.

³² Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 201-3.

³³ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 196-7.

³⁴ Quoted in Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 196.

own decisions.³⁵ As Gleijeses summarized, “this was Amilcar’s war; [the Cubans] were there to help, to offer advice, and to follow the PAIGC’s lead.”³⁶ Cabral worked with the Cubans specifically because he felt a connection to their culture and Castro’s anti-imperialist politics. As Cabral once said while visiting Cuban troops in the Congo, “we can be sure that the souls of our forefathers who were taken away to America to be slaves are rejoicing today to see their children reunited and working together to be independent and free.”³⁷ Cabral’s speech shows how the global contexts of the Cold War and decolonization were always tied together. Cabral managed both contexts to secure foreign support.

Portugal attempted to salvage the conflict in 1968 with the arrival of Antonio de Spínola, a counter-insurgency commander from the concurrent war in Angola. Spínola knew the cycle of Portugal bombing the PAIGC from the air, while the PAIGC attacked Portuguese forts and ambushed convoys, was not working. Spínola decided on a new ‘hearts and minds’ strategy of building support for Portugal, while undercutting the PAIGC’s base of support. He learned that much of PAIGC’s popular support came from initiatives like schools and medical care that the Portuguese had failed to provide.³⁸ In response, Spínola built 164 schools, 40 hospitals, tens of thousands of houses, and provided nearly all of Guinea-Bissau’s doctors. But Spínola’s plan was not peaceful either. The PAIGC nicknamed it ‘blood and smiles.’³⁹ His schools and hospitals were only available near his forts. Spínola encouraged the population to use his infrastructure instead of the PAIGC’s by bombing the PAIGC’s schools and hospitals as part of an escalation of the air campaign. His plan did not stop at the borders either: he reinforced the forts of Guilede and Copa at the borders and then destroyed PAIGC shelters in refugee camps outside Guinea-Bissau. He even raided Conakry in 1970 in a bungled attempt to kill Sékou Touré, the leader of an independent African nation, and Cabral. Spínola’s plan saw Portugal make major military

35 Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 198-9.

36 Ibid, 199.

37 Quoted in Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 199.

38 Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea was really set free*, 37-39.

39 Norrie MacQueen, “Portugal’s First Domino: ‘Pluricontinentalism’ and Colonial War in Guiné-Bissau, 1963–1974,” *Contemporary European History* 8, no. 2 (1999): 209–11.

gains but while he had weakened the PAIGC, they were undefeated.⁴⁰

Despite Spínola’s campaign, PAIGC began to recover their advantage and approached a military victory but not before Cabral’s assassination. Portugal still sought to strike the PAIGC’s leadership and developed a plan with Cabral’s internal rivals to kidnap him from Conakry, but killed Cabral.⁴¹ Cabral’s assassination revitalized the PAIGC, as they were now even more determined to strike back against Portugal.⁴² In 1972, PAIGC received anti-aircraft weaponry from the Soviet Union, jeopardizing Portugal’s airpower advantage. As the new Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, who had succeeded Salazar following his stroke in 1968, noted, “our unchallenged air superiority, which had been our trump card and the basis of our entire military policy...had suddenly evaporated.”⁴³ The PAIGC accelerated their attacks on forts, and captured Guilede in May 1973. In September, the PAIGC declared the independence of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau and secured substantial international recognition, including a UN General Assembly resolution demanding Portuguese withdrawal. Copa fell to PAIGC in February 1974, leaving only a small part of the country under Portuguese rule and a PAIGC military victory imminent.⁴⁴

But the final act of the war returned to the international context, as the *Estado Novo*’s attempts to hold onto their colonies would ultimately bring the regime down and finally end the conflict. Spínola published a book in February 1974, advocating a transition from a colonial system to a federal system with a substantial devolution of power to the colonies. This book gave a voice to growing discontent within the army over the *Estado Novo*’s attempts to hold onto the African colonies with little chance of success despite the growing cost in money and lives. The military then ousted Caetano and the *Estado Novo* in a coup in April 1974 that brought Spínola to

40 Dhada, *Warriors at Work: How Guinea was really set free*, 40-44.

41 Ibid, 46-8.

42 Mustafah Dhada, “The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered,” *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 590.

43 Quoted in Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976*, 210; MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 64.

44 Mustafah Dhada, “The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered,” *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 590-3.

power.⁴⁵ Spinola did not intend to withdraw from Africa, instead seeking ceasefires to implement his federal vision, but encountered an unavoidable problem.⁴⁶ As MacQueen summarized, “Lisbon demanded cease fires as a prerequisite for a political solution while the liberation movements demanded the political solution of guaranteed independence as a prerequisite for cease-fires.”⁴⁷ Negotiations with the PAIGC soon deadlocked. Spinola advocated for self-determination but refused to recognize the PAIGC as an instrument of that self-determination; he advocated for a referendum which was internationally viewed as an excuse to prolong Portuguese control. His efforts failing, in July 1974, Spinola finally agreed to recognize Guinea-Bissau’s independence - allowing negotiations with PAIGC to resume and they came to a quick resolution. Portugal officially recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974.⁴⁸ That October, the PAIGC marched into the capital – Guinea-Bissau was liberated.⁴⁹

The liberation war of Guinea-Bissau was caused by the brutality of Portuguese oppression and aided by the international context of the struggle. The war may have erupted in 1963, but ongoing resistance to assimilation and forced labour meant that the PAIGC was mobilizing existing resistance to mistreatment into a protracted armed struggle. While Portuguese mistreatment may explain the origins of the war it does not explain the PAIGC’s extraordinary success. The answer for that lies in Cabral’s diplomatic ability to leverage both the decolonization movement and the Cold War to gain maximum advantage and to free Guinea-Bissau from Portuguese colonial rule.

⁴⁵ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 72-8.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 84-5.

⁴⁷ MacQueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*, 85.

⁴⁸ Luís Nuno Rodrigues, “António de Spínola and the International Context of Portuguese Decolonization,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 50, no. 2 (2013): 103-113.

⁴⁹ Mustafah Dhada, “The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered,” *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 593.

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Rural Socialism in Nyerere's Tanzania: Ujamaa Villages, Kulaks, and International Finance

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"We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have need of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our past, in the traditional society which produced us."

-- President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, 1964-1985

Introduction

When prompted to think critically about the political trajectories of African states after independence

from European colonial rule, one cannot help but recall the visions of a new political economy based on egalitarianism and even development that littered the African continent from Leopold Senghor's Senegal to Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana to Julius Nyerere's Tanzania. In that moment of decolonization in the 1960s and 70s, African state leaders, at least those interested in transforming their political economies, were forced to confront the challenge of erecting new institutions from the colonial institutions they inherited -- institutions founded on the weaponization of difference, human exploitation, resource extraction, and dominance.

For those interested in building their states in the socialist political economic tradition, two kinds of institutional changes were paramount: (1) the creation of a political base of support that united all segments of African society from rural peasants to urban workers to civil servants,

and (2) state capture or effective control of the commanding heights of the economy which can be understood as the national economy's crucial industries.¹ It is only when both are achieved that leaders could begin to chart their unique trajectory of socialist development.

In Tanzania, this advice was headed and in 1961, the year of independence, then Prime Minister of Tanganyika and later President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, spent the first year of his prime ministership organizing the nation's political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). He and the party's political leaders began transforming it from an anti-colonial African nationalist organization to a national socialist party focused on egalitarian socialist development and self-reliance. This political base for socialist development in Tanzania grew and very soon a significant proportion of the population was organized into ten party factions representing all segments of society, from youth to women to workers.

Furthermore, in 1967, after a significant fall in world prices for Tanzania's major export crops, Nyerere's party and government implemented policies that gave the government, and by extension the people, control over the commanding heights of the national economy.² Nyerere's government took over banks and insurance firms which made it exponentially easier for managers to direct credit and domestic revenues to key economic sectors in need of financing and toward development projects. They also placed key industries under parastatal control, incorporated the voices of workers in firm decision-making by expanding worker councils, and replaced transnational corporate managers with Tanzanian university graduates.³

The maintenance of a relatively cohesive political base of support under TANU and virtually effective control over national finance and key industries, allowed Tanzania to embark on its own socialist experiment and implement the policy of Ujamaa rural socialism, without fear of major disruption from international financial institutions, powerful governments in the

A. 1 Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea, and African People's Struggle* (London, 1969)

2 *The Arusha Declaration* (Dar es Salaam, 1967)

A. 3 Seidman, "African Socialism and the World System: Dependency, Transnational Corporations, & International Debt" in C. Rosberg, T. Callaghy, *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (University of California, 1979)

Global North, and private investors. In this brief survey, I will outline how Tanzania's unique Ujamaa rural socialism was theorized and implemented within the context of an imposing global capitalist economic order.

Theory of Change: Ujamaa Rural Socialism

The policy of Ujamaa socialism, Ujamaa roughly meaning "community", is outlined authoritatively in TANU's Arusha Declaration and Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance wherein President Nyerere penned the state's democratic socialist aspirations and outlined a path toward socialist development and self-reliance that centered around agrarian, rural development. In the Declaration's third section, the Policy of Self-Reliance, Nyerere rejects conventional conceptions of development that over-rely on capital-intensive industries and positions agricultural production and a hard-working populace organized in cooperative villages, called Ujamaa villages, as Tanzania's pathway to development. In Nyerere's view, an overreliance on capital-intensive industries would require significant loans from abroad, foreign gifts, aid, and private investment are all approaches to social and economic transformation that can compromise Tanzania's political and economic sovereignty and the project of socialist state-building.⁴

Furthermore, Nyerere offers four prerequisites for development in Tanzania, of which fertile land and hardworking people are central: people, land, good policies, and good leadership. Nyerere argues that with these four principles Tanzania can develop on its own terms and keep its sovereignty and egalitarian political economy intact. Robust agricultural production is ideal for Tanzanian development because it leverages the nation's strengths – fertile land that gets sufficient rain. Additionally, it allows the nation to feed itself and produce enough to export abroad for profits in foreign currency which is necessary for paying the nation's foreign debts and investing in development projects.⁵

⁴ Dar es Salaam, 1967

⁵ Dar es Salaam, 1967

Implementation of Ujamaa Rural Socialism

At the heart of TANU and Nyerere's concept of Ujamaa rural socialism is the organization of rural society into Ujamaa cooperative villages – where villagers could live and produce collectively for the benefit of all members of their village. The policy can be understood as being organized in three steps: (1) the process of villagization, encouraging people to move their homes into single villages, (2) persuading people to start communal plots, separate from their private or family plots, on which they can work cooperatively with other villagers, and (3) persuade villagers to commit all of their productive activity to communal production.⁶

Similarly, the progression of the policy's implementation can be understood in three phases starting from soft persuasion to compulsory villagization.⁷ In the first phase in 1967-1969, persuasion was the medium of choice for the acceleration of villagization and the building of Ujamaa villages. The President's remarks on Ujamaa villages were widely circulated, the government-held leadership seminars, and ministers toured rural areas encouraging villagers to join. However, these efforts yielded meager results as by 1969, only 1.7 percent of the population had moved to villages.⁸ The second phase, from 1969-1973, which saw an increase to 15.5 percent of the population in villages, employed persuasion and incentives to get Tanzanians to move to villages. In fact, TANU and government officials, as well as candidates, were threatened with rejection



⁶ JK. Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development" in Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism*

⁷ D. McHenry Jr., "The Struggle for Rural Socialism in Tanzania" in C. Rosberg, T. Callaghy, *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (University of California, 1979)

⁸ *Quarterly Statistical Bulletin*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (June 1975)

or dismissal if they did not work closely with and live in villages. Finally, the last phase of implementation, from 1973 to 1976, employed the rapid compulsive enforcement of villagization timetables by regional administrators and by the end of 1976, in accordance with the president's deadline, 90 percent of the population had been moved to villages.⁹

Domestic Frustrations & the International Community

Despite the significant effort to organize the population into cooperative villages, communal production was largely a failure. This failure can be attributed, though not completely, to the famine and drought that ravaged the country in the 1970s -- which forced the nation to cede some ground to the liberalization demands of Bretton Woods institutions in order to receive aid -- but more aptly to a small group of very wealthy peasants, *kulaks*, who because of their subservience to the British colonial government during colonial rule received special incentives and were able to expand their private land holdings. When the policy was extended to areas where they were present, implementation was slow and protracted and regional administrators faced open resistance.¹⁰ Class difference sowed by the colonial regime is what frustrated the effective building of Ujamaa socialism in Tanzania.

Though in many cases of socialist state-building across the African continent, foreign interference was what eventually caused socialist ambitions to crumble – such was not exactly the case in Tanzania. Tanzania owed large debts to international finance organizations, especially during the famine of the 1970s, but Nyerere's control of the nation's major industries and financial sector allowed for Western protests to rural socialism to have a minimal impact on Tanzania's socialist trajectory.¹¹

Conclusion

⁹ Press Release A/2944/73, 6 November 1973

¹⁰ Case No. 212 (Saidi Mwanwindi v. R.) Crim. Sess. 37-Iringa-72, 2 October 1972

¹¹ The Tanzanian reaction was bitter; see the editorial in *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), 22 December 1974

The case of Tanzania is not unique because it boasts the achievement of socialist utopia; in fact, Nyerere's Ujamaa socialism was far from achieving utopia for reasons surveyed briefly above. However, why this case is unique lies in its relative unobstruction by the devices and whims of global capital which receives its marching orders from the Global North. An energized political base of support organized under the TANU and effective control over the commanding heights of the economy and the nation's banks secured Tanzania's political and economic sovereignty and allowed the real policy work of building socialism after colonization to commence.

The fall of the USSR and subsequent cementing of neoliberalism globally, enforced by U.S. monetary supremacy and international financial institutions, degraded the latitude of control African states could wield over their economic affairs. However, an emerging period of bipolarity and the significant investment of financial and human resources in the development of economic and trade cohesion in Africa (i.e. the African Continental Free Trade Area) offer opportunities for creative development policy on the continent. An effective development program cannot and will not be realized solely by theorization and scholarship but by trial and error and the maintenance of an aggressive feedback loop with the people. Analyzing development programs like President Nyerere's Ujamaa rural socialism gives legibility to the challenges of the past and offers lessons for effective grand strategy development policy on the African continent, and perhaps the Global South at large.

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
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The Tanzanian reaction was bitter; see the editorial in *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), 22 December 1974

International Migration: The Legacies of Labor and Trade Agreements

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International affairs are vital to the global economy, development, and even diplomacy between states. However, one of the driving issues that affect international affairs is international migration because states seek out labor and trade agreements in order to keep up with the supply and demand of globalization. Mexico is one of many countries in the world where international migration is encouraged because of its labor surplus, unemployment, and poverty that strained its own development and economy. Although international migrants only make “3.5% of the global population” according to the *World Migration Report 2020* written by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (20). Migrants may leave their country of origin if push factors like conflict such as wars, violence, and persecution that relates to political and religious affiliations




occur within a state. Professor Marissa Brookes defines an international migrant as an individual who i) has “settled permanently” in another country, ii) has “temporary contracts”, iii) is employed by transnational corporations also known as (TNCS), iv) “undocumented workers”, or v) “refugees and asylum seekers” (Lecture Wk 6, Slide 3, 11-16). In this paper, I intend to discuss international migration and the legacies of both labor and trade agreements between states in order to explore how international affairs are vital to international migration: how the overview of migration patterns in the U.S. lead to agreements such as the case study of Mexico: Bracero Program (1942-1964) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the role of transnational corporations (TNCs)

on free trade as seen in the case of India, and how the health crisis caused by the coronavirus has devastated many economies which could potentially lead to higher rates of international migration.

International Migration: Patterns of Migration in the U.S.

The U.S. has a reputation for being known as the land of opportunity to pursue the American dream which is seen in the United Nation’s annual report entitled, *International*

Figure A4: Comparing outward *bracero* flows reported by Mexico with inward stocks reported by U.S. Dept. of Agriculture



Sources: In Figure A4a the annual total outflow of *braceros* from Mexico to the U.S. is from Gonzalez Navarro (1974, Vol. 2, Cuadro 39, p. 141), which sources principally the *Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos de México* but contains data not reported in the *Anuario*, for years 1955–1957, gathered directly from the government by the author.

Mexico is an example of a middle-income country that has a labor surplus and a growing income gap. This has caused unemployment and poverty to undermine its ambition to build a strong and steady economy. The *World Migration Report 2020* by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) highlighted that Mexico makes the second largest country in which


international migrants originate from estimating “12 million” international migrants in host countries.¹ The Bracero Program was an example of a formal labor supply agreement created by a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico which issued grants of millions of temporary labor contracts to Mexican workers in exchange for decent working conditions, wages, housing, and food. Braceros helped the U.S. bridge the gap in the harvesting and manual labor industry as a solution to the shortage of labor that occurred during the U.S.’s involvement in World War II (1939-1945).² The Mexican government believed that these policies would provide jobs that would help their workers gain knowledge and experience which could give an insight into creating a strong economy. It was also perceived to be an agreement that could have allowed them to help stimulate their economy. However, Mexican workers dealt with a series of issues during the duration of this program such as inadequate working and living conditions, inhumane practices such as the fumigation of braceros with a chemical compound known as Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), as well as withholding 10% of bracero’s earnings to guarantee that the workers would continue to work among other things.³ This formal international migration agreement allowed the U.S. to exploit millions of braceros because Mexico provided them with a cheap source of labor that could replace regular wages and benefits that would otherwise have to be paid to Americans. Moises Gonzalez Navarro’s graph entitled Figure A4 from his 2nd volume of *Cuadro 39* best illustrates the misconception about the benefits of the Bracero Program (141).⁴ In other words, the data shows the estimation of outflows from both the Mexican government and the U.S. (results from the Bracero Program through 1940-1970). This illustrates the misconception that the peaks reached were significantly lower when reported by U.S. farmers, hence this agreement did not live up to the expectations

1 “Figure 3: Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2019 (millions)” pg. 44

2 The UCLA Labor Center stated this statistic as a way to point out a motive and reason behind the agreement.

3 National Young Farmers Coalition in *Braceros: The Controversial History of US-Mexico Farm Worker Programs with Dr. Matthew Garcia* explored in a podcast the issues that braceros dealt with during the ongoing labor agreement.

4 Gonzalez Navarro, Moises and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, *Poblacion y Sociedad en Mexico 1974*, pg. 141



The North American Trade Agreement was signed in 1994 between the United States of America, Canada, and Mexico as a policy that could help promote an expansion of trade by effectively lowering costs of manufacturing and expanding trade. This agreement would i) eliminate tariffs and other barriers on products and services between these countries. ii) It was also creating many manufacturing jobs by maximizing the productivity and the process of trading among these nations. iii) Another benefit was the improving margins of profits by distributing the manufacturing process and labor. However, there were a few cons to this agreement such as the sentiment of Americans towards immigrants for stealing jobs which was later used by President Trump in his election campaign in 2016. An example is the special report published by the International Trade Administration highlighting the *Overview of NAFTA After 10 Years* which depicts two graphs. The first (left side) points out the mutual benefit of NAFTA as it led Mexico (106%) and Canada (62%) to outperform the rest of the world (36%) in Export Growth. But the second graph points out the U.S.’s dependence on Mexico as a cheap source of labor with a share of 63% of all imports from Mexico (1). This led to the argument that Trump later used to talk about the failure of this agreement because it was supposedly responsible for outsourcing many jobs in the U.S. In other words, Trump utilized the international affair of NAFTA as a way to gain support from workers who were affected by the outsourcing of jobs in some areas and blamed NAFTA as the cause. International affairs like labor and trade agreements (NAFTA) can be weaponized for the failure to meet the expectations of states, causing long-

lasting consequences on all the parties involved such as the outsourcing of jobs in the U.S. from transnational corporations in order to prevent taxes, paying minimum wages, benefits, etc.⁵

The power of Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Transnational Corporations can hold a monopoly of power if it surpasses the borders of a state by undermining the power of countries to be regulated. These TNCs exercise their power by contributing to politicians through donations, and lobbying regulatory agencies and the government to help assert their influence over the regulations that will be enacted globally. Moreover, if TNCs feel wary about a country that they are exploiting then they may move to a less restrictive country with no regulations and a cheap source of labor. This ultimately disrupts the country that was hosting the TNC because it creates a series of issues that affect the country's economy by outsourcing jobs overseas, driving unemployment rates, and causing push factors that may lead to a migration of people. Hence, workers have turned to the use of campaign governance⁶ and private governance⁷ as a way to mediate and effectively prevent TNCs from exploiting countries that supply cheap labor. Campaign governance often compares the success and different outcomes of the approaches of workers in global unions such as: the UNI Global Union and the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations known as (IUF). These global unions (GUFs) are international organizations made up of members from different industries and countries that allow workers across the world to fight for their interests within the same industry. This is beneficial to workers in these unions because it limits the impact of transnational corporations leaving a country. In other words, these international organizations help workers from the same industry obtain an

⁵ U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, and Office of Industry Trade Policy 2004, 1

⁶ Santanu Sarkar and Sarosh Kuruvilla in *Constructing Transnational Solidarity: The Role of Campaign Governance* (2020) define the characteristics of a “campaign governance” as a) “internal consistency” within “campaign elements” and b) “...local concerns in affiliate countries to find voice in global campaigns...to result in concrete gains at the local level” are needed in order to effectively fight the power that TNCs have (29).

⁷ In *Lecture_Wk8 Tuesday Slideshow*, Slide 9, Professor Brookes pointed out a quote from Vogel in 2010 that best encompasses private governance. It states that “developing countries” should be able to strengthen our society by allowing “citizens...to define and defend their social, political and environmental interests...from elites...corruption, human rights violations” (Vogel, 82).

established line of communication that will prevent one country from having more say than another. Unlike campaign governance, private governance allows big brand corporations to benefit more because suppliers may lose money for making changes. TNCs want to keep labor costs down; cost the factories money as opposed to brand corporations or retail stores, and the credit for having good regulations and standards is always given to the name brand corporations. There are benefits that countries can have if private governance is utilized such as protecting the environment, better labor practices, and also establishing protections to the civil rights of workers.

The Case of India: A Global Campaign for Workers

In the case study of India, workers in India are a good example of what it means to engage in a global campaign that allowed workers to create “local coalitions” as institutions that would not only fight for workers but also utilized “campaign strategies, tactics and post-campaign activities” in order to allow workers to have influence in the policies that would affect their experiences as workers (29).⁸ An example is the global campaign from the UNI in India which allowed an agreement to be reached enabling security guards to create a partial organization that could facilitate the process of bargaining with TNCs. However, the IUF campaign helped create a global organization composed of unions that were partnered with five different factories from Nestle in India. The campaign helped workers become proactive members in discussion with their employers in order to petition for collective bargaining policies that would benefit all workers. Sarkar and Kuruvilla are right to point out India's case study because it illustrates how powerful global campaigns can be since workers can help regulate and keep TNCs accountable. The strategies of these workers to protest and bargain with the corporations have helped establish a precedent for the rights of workers. Despite this, the *World Migration Report (2020)* stated that India is the country with the most international migrants with approximately 18 million migrants in (International Organization for Migration). In my

⁸ Santanu Sarkar and Sarosh Kuruvilla in *Constructing Transnational Solidarity: The Role of Campaign Governance* (2020)

opinion, one of the reasons why international migration occurs is due to push and pull factors that may be attributed to Transnational Corporations when they leave a country for another in order to limit the costs of regulations and higher labor costs. These types of governance allow workers to disrupt the international affairs between states and TNCs, hence allowing workers to effectively bargain their rights, wages, and conditions.

Pandemic & Coronavirus: A New Era for the Modern Worker

In conclusion, international migration has been instrumental to the development and establishment of every country because migrants have helped build many economies around the world. However, many migrants left their countries due to push factors that led them to escape conflict and a lack of opportunity in their country of origin. This paper is intended to explore international migrants as a subject of international affairs that can be showcased by the legacies of labor and trade agreements that impacted workers around the world. At the moment, there is little to no data regarding the impact of the pandemic that resulted from the spread of the Coronavirus (Covid 19). However, a Census Bureau survey entitled, *The 2019 American Community Survey* stated that “69% of undocumented immigrant workers hold jobs that are deemed essential” according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In other words, international migrant workers are facing a double-edged sword in host countries such as having to choose between working in the middle of a health crisis and getting covid or working with no safety net (stimulus or government help) or losing a job with an economy that has turned into a Great Depression. The reality is that the long-term consequences of the pandemic will probably not be known until a few years have gone by. International migration is the intersection of international affairs that stems from states to states, from states to corporations, and from corporations to workers. My intention was to illustrate the trends of international migration in the U.S. as an international affair that affects the policies that are implemented, Mexico as a case study with a focus on the Bracero Program which illustrates the injustices of this agreement and also how NAFTA and the impact of this agreement on migration perception in the U.S.

After this, I focused on TNCs and the different types of governance with a focus on India as a case study of how important global campaigns are to the causes of workers. My intention is to showcase the historical legacies of agreements in both Mexico and India and how those agreements have impacted international migration. I also intend to reflect on the policies in the U.S. like the Bracero Program and NAFTA as lost opportunities that failed as a result of a lack of a global campaign that could have allowed all parties and workers to voice the issues and priorities of their respective institutions. Ideally, Free Trade Agreements or any agreements like NAFTA and Bracero Program would consider the impact on workers and their rights but these agreements failed to provide workers a platform where workers could be heard. The Bracero Program has unjust working and living conditions for Mexicans and international migrants are facing harsh conditions like the Braceros because they are jeopardizing their lives in the middle of a pandemic for another dollar in order to pay bills. On the other hand, NAFTA was an example of an agreement that benefitted corporations by lowering prices and having bigger margin profits. However, this also caused the U.S. to outsource jobs and create a dependence on cheap labor. I also talked about India because it is an example of a global campaign but also it is a country in which migration is the highest. This allowed me to examine the culmination of all of these historical legacies and the unanswered questions and data that prevent us from knowing how international migrants are impacted. International migrants are repeating the cycle of the Braceros and TNCs are benefitting from it. Capitalism has strained workers between choices that will impact their lives as workers who live paycheck to paycheck and live the American Dream. The reality is that this era for the modern worker is scary because international migrants are working as essential workers and providing services that are helping fight against Covid in the front line. At the same time, we are left with the knowledge that more than 37,000 people have lost their lives migrating during this pandemic (March 2020-February 2021) according to the International Organization for Migration’s *Missing Migrants Project* which is not including “the thousands of deaths...among migrant workers and [their] deaths” connected to COVID-19.

Hence, international migrants ought to create a global campaign in which they advocate for their rights and gain hazard pay, access to basic healthcare, or even grants that can help unemployed workers pay bills more effectively.

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Militarized Interstate Disputes and Conflict Escalation

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Introduction

When do nations go to war? A vast pool of studies, looking at many regions and timeframes, has identified several structural factors that predict war. While these factors – such as the type of government a state has or its alliances – help identify which states are predisposed to go to war with each other, they do not explain why two countries’ grievances escalate into full-blown conflict in certain instances but not others. For that, we must examine the precursors of war - militarized interstate disputes.

Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are defined as “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones et al. 1996, 163). This paper aims to do the following:

1. Study MIDs as an outcome rather than a cause, thus understanding their role in the steps between dispute initiation and escalation
2. Extend studies of recurrent conflict to escalation
3. Examine relations on a dyadic basis, looking at the history of MIDs and escalation between pairs of nations, not just individual MIDs
4. Examine the role that MIDs play in signaling, and incorporate our findings to into existing theories of resolve.

First, instead of studying the causes of MIDs, we examine the role of MIDs in the intermediate steps between dispute initiation and conflict escalation. Drawing this distinction is important

as the factors that cause MIDs are not the same factors that lead to escalation, so a focus on the causes of disputes between countries fails to fully explain why those countries might escalate. Indeed, the factors leading to MIDs may also prevent escalation. For example, research suggests that media transparency reduces the risk of military interstate disputes, as does democracy (Choi and James 2006, 23). However, an analysis of 300 dyads found that, controlling for standard explanations of war, higher levels of media exposure are correlated with the escalation of disputes (Miller and Bokemper, 2016). There is a relative lack of literature examining MIDs as causes, and we hope to remedy the explanatory gap between the causes of disputes and the outcome of escalation.

Further complicating the matter, MID recurrence and MID escalation are two separate outcomes. For instance, democracies are more likely to resolve MIDs through negotiations and mutual concessions (Mousseau, 1998), and MIDs that terminate via settlements (imposed or negotiated) are likely to lead to longer peace (Senese and Quackenbush, 2003). Although MIDs between democracies are less likely to recur, they may be more likely to escalate due to media transparency (Miller and Bokemper, 2016). To account for this, our study extends these studies of recurrent conflict by introducing escalation, rather than future MIDs, as a dependent variable.

Thirdly, we review relations on a dyadic rather than a MID-level basis - instead of looking at the qualities of individual disputes or of the latest dispute, we will study escalation pair-by-pair, the history of disputes between two nations, and the overall quality of those disputes.

Lastly, to understand why MIDs escalate rather than recur, we must understand the motivations behind MIDs in the first place. Researchers have theorized that MIDs are initiated as a costly signal of resolve, to attach importance to certain issues, as a form of bargaining, and/or to deter conflict (Wiegand 2011, 103). We discuss these theories in detail.

Our research is particularly important because of a few observations. First, only a small percentage of MIDs escalate into war. While there have been 221 documented instances of war since 1816, there have been over 4,000 MIDs since 1816 (Correlates of War, 2018). Second, while aggregate war has been declining (Barber, 2016), the number of MIDs is increasing (Prins; Figure 1). In a world with an increasing number of disputes and a decreasing percentage of them escalating, predicting which disputes will lead to war is more important than ever. The world only has a finite amount of military and diplomatic resources. Knowing when disputes pose the threat of a large-scale loss of life helps policymakers formulate foreign policy strategies that promote peace.

Preliminary Discussion

With the number of MIDs increasing and the prevalence of war decreasing, we start with the question of if the two phenomena are related and how the causes of MIDs differ from the causes of war. Wiegand argues the objective, conflict is very costly for both sides, so states will always prefer to attain their goals without it, via negotiation and signaling; these negotiations are a diplomacy of violence - the threat of war itself is the primary bargaining chip (Schelling 1970, 1-33). The term ‘resolve’ refers to ‘how much a state will risk war to keep its promises and uphold its threats’ (Wiegand 2011, 103). A state’s promise to wage war is null if the state never wages war. A state’s perceived resolve should be very important in determining how seriously other states react to their demands and threats. The mutually bad outcome of war occurs when there is a mismatch between the perceived and actual levels of resolve.

Engaging in MIDs is an excellent way of demonstrating resolve and bolstering the credibility of future violence. Actions with a cost to them - sacrificing autonomy to join a military alliance, deploying of troops, or, as in the case of MIDs, engaging in small-scale displays of force - are costly deposits that commit to the threat of violence. There is some support for the idea of an overall reputation for resolve; Wiegand finds that a given state becomes

4 times more likely to initiate a territorial MID if it has initiated a MID with a different adversary in the same month (Wiegand, 2011). The finding is used to support the theory that displaying force via MIDs and showing willingness for violence is important to demonstrate the depth of commitments.

The purpose of this study is to test the theory that MIDs are used for the purpose of communications and signaling in conflict, which reduces the risk of miscalculation. We test that theory against empirical data by seeing if dyads that fight long series of MIDs are less likely to escalate than dyads that do not. We have a two-part “peaking” hypothesis. First, states that engage in MIDs relatively rarely are the least likely to go to conflict, because there is little cause for contention. Second, as the number of MIDs increases, states become more likely to escalate up to a certain point; then, the likelihood of escalation decreases and levels off, because of effective signaling. Our hypothesis runs counter to an intuitive “boiling pot” hypothesis, in which countries that dispute a lot build up resentment for each other and escalate. It also questions the hypotheses that conflate the causes of disputes with the causes of war and say that countries with many disputes have much to fight over and are more likely to escalate.

We ask the following research questions: (1) What is the relationship between the quantity of disputes between two dyads and the probability of escalation, after accounting for known structural predictors of war, such as polity, proximity, and power status? (2) How does the overall history of MIDs between two countries change the probability of escalation? To answer question 1, we will treat the number of MIDs between two countries as an independent variable and whether the MIDs escalated to war as a dependent variable. The ‘number of MIDs’ variable will be defined as the number of MIDs between those two countries in the past 10 years. This timeframe is chosen to account for changes in the overall structural properties of a country. As defined in our dataset by the Correlates of War, conflict becomes ‘war’ when 1000 troops are deployed or 100 people die in battle; the ‘escalation of war’ is an event, which happens the day a conflict between two states becomes war (Maoz et. al. 2018). To answer question 2, we will look

at the hostility level of disputes by median and their average settlement results.

What known structural predictors of war should we account for? Bremer ranks commonly hypothesized structural predictors of war in terms of their actual effect on the probability of war. In descending order of importance, they are: proximity, power status, presence of alliances, militarization, democratization, power parity, and economic development, with the latter two having little effect (Bremer, 1992). Of these, we have selected proximity, power status, and democratization as predictors (Bremer's finding that alliances increase the risk of war is controversial). We follow Bremer's methodology and define 'proximate states' by land or water contiguity, with water contiguity being states that are separated by less than 400 miles of water as defined by Correlates of War Contiguity 3.1 (Douglas et. al. 2002). We use the Polity Project's assessment of how democratic states are (CSP, 2014).

Methods and Datasets

Correlates of War

The Correlates of War datasets are well established in international relations studies, because they are free and easy to access, contain extensive narratives about each instance, and research countries in different times to an exhaustive degree of historical rigor. Our primary dataset is Dyadic MIDs 3.1, compiled in 2019, which lists all recorded MIDs between dyads from 1816-2010. In total, it contains information on 4,591 MIDs. We also use Direct Contiguity 3.1, which considers water borders consistent with our definitions and has information from 1816-2006. The datasets were created by dividing up historical research for different datasets (ICPSR) among institutions nationwide that agree to maintain, update, and add to them. Historical inaccuracies and errors are found by scholars throughout the world, and the datasets are updated accordingly. Dyadic MIDs 3.1 contains information on the start and end times of the disputes (to the day), the outcome of the dispute (victory, stalemate, compromise), the type

of settlement (imposed or negotiated), the number of deaths, the highest level of military action, the initiator, and the number of states involved, among other variables. The dataset is limited primarily by its historical accuracy - the farther back the recorded MIDs are, the more missing data there is. The frequency at which the dataset is updated with new information indicates that the exact details of MIDs from two centuries ago are not always accurate.

Polity 4

The Polity 4 dataset covers all countries with more than 500,000 people from 1800-2000 and gathers historical data on these countries. The creators of the dataset evaluate the method of executive recruitment, constraints on political competition, and a variety of other factors to give the nation a democracy score from -10 to +10 over time (Polity, 2020). Figure 2 is an example of a provided graph we use to evaluate states over time (Authority Trends, 1947-2013: Pakistan). Such an evaluation is subjective, and just like the Correlates of War datasets, contain more missing data from the 19th century. In addition, there are a few recorded MIDs between states that have only existed for a brief period of time (e.g. Saxony, Mecklenburg Schwerin) and are not documented by the Polity dataset.

Great Power Status

Lastly, classifications of great powers throughout history are generally agreed upon with some minor discrepancies regarding timeframes. University of Buffalo Professor Vesna Danilovic deliberates over these in "When the Stakes are High", and we use her classification of great powers over time (Danilovic, 2002).

Variable Codings

For each dispute between two countries from 1816-2010, a war is classified by the

Correlates of War as a dispute having over 1,000 battle deaths. Each country with 100 battle deaths or 1,000 deployments in ‘battle-related activities’ is considered a participant (Maoz et. al., 2018). For each dispute between two countries, we also measure the number of disputes in the previous 10 years between those two countries. From this, we compute the proportion of disputes that are wars. We discuss potential shortcomings of this methodology at the end of this paper.

Countries that have undergone significant restructuring, to the point of being coded differently by the Correlates of War, are considered separate, and dispute counts before restructuring are not counted for incidents after it. Also, wars themselves are counted in these ten disputes, solving the analytical issue of countries that war frequently being represented as having fewer disputes.

A democratic country in a particular year is one that scores 6 or above on the Polity Index, since this is the classification used by the Polity Project (Polity, 2020). In each dispute-dyad, we count the number of democratic countries (0, 1 or 2), which tells us if the dispute is between two democratic countries, two non-democratic countries, or one of each. We code the number of great powers in a dyad using the same system, with 2 representing a dispute-dyad with 2 great powers.

The Correlates of War dataset includes 4 settlement results: Negotiated, Imposed, None, and Ongoing. According to Senese and Quackenbush, disputes that are negotiated or imposed are more likely to avoid sustained conflict (Senese and Quackenbush, 2003). To test the distinction between conflict recurrence and escalation, we code disputes that are settled by imposition or negotiation as 0 and disputes that are not settled as 1. For each dispute between two countries, we take the average settlement result of the disputes between those countries from the past ten years as a number between 0 and 1. Dyads without any disputes in the past 10 years have an average settlement result of 0, as there are no disputes to settle.

In addition, we consider the hostility level of previous disputes between the countries.

Based on the Correlates of War codings, we assign:

- 0 - No Hostility
- 1 - Threat to use force
- 2 - Display of force
- 3 - Use of force
- 4 - Interstate War

The median dispute hostility is calculated for the dyad, for the previous ten years. No disputes in a dyad during this timeframe is considered no hostility.

To test our hypothesis, we will use a stepwise series of probit models:

1. $P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Quadratic}(\# \text{ of Disputes in past 10 Years})$
2. $P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Quadratic}(\# \text{ of Disputes in past 10 Years}) + \text{Average Dispute Qualities}$
3. $P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Quadratic}(\# \text{ of Disputes in past 10 Years}) + \text{Average Dispute Qualities} + \text{Structural Dyad Factors}$
4. $P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Structural Dyad Factor}$

The term ‘Average Dispute Qualities’ is used to refer to the median dispute hostility level and the average settlement results. ‘Structural Dyad Factors’ are the variables that are properties of the country themselves as opposed to individual disputes and include the number of democratic countries in the pair, the number of great powers, and if the dyad is contiguous.

Using a stepwise methodology in this case is important due to the collinearity between the factors that causes disputes and the factors that cause war. It is highly expected that structural factors that lead to escalation also lead to disputes. The first model is used simply to determine

the predictive relationship between dispute number and the probability of escalation. The second incorporates the average quality of those disputes and discovers to what degree they are related to the probability of escalation and if accounting for such factors make the relationship between escalation and the number of disputes weaker or stronger. The third model is our primary model and accounts for known causes of escalation as well. Lastly, we can use the fourth model in comparison with the other three to answer to what extent structural (relatively permanent) factors explain and predict the incidence of war, and to what extent dispute factors (relatively incidental) do. The third and fourth models also attempt to address the difference between the way structural factors like contiguity predict war, given that these countries have been engaging in disputes. We also analyze factors like average dispute settlement and hostility on a bivariate basis, and facet the relationship between the number of disputes and the probability of escalation by contiguity, democracy, and great power status.

Results

We conduct several analyses to attempt to uncover the relationship between the quantity of disputes between two dyads and the probability of escalation before and after controlling for known correlates of war. We also examine the way factors like median dispute hostility and average settlement result affect the probability of escalation.

Escalation and Number of Disputes




Figure 3 - Number of Past MIDs and Proportion of Escalations

The first relationship is the predictive relationship between the number of MIDs between two countries in the past 10 years at the point of each dispute and the probability of escalation. This pertains to model 1. Figure 3 displays a smooth regression of the number of disputes in the past ten years within a dyad at the point of each dispute and the proportion of those disputes that escalated to wars. The largest proportion of dispute escalations occurs between two states who have had 3 disputes in the past 10 years and is .23. The mean number of disputes before war is 6.6. Overall, 14% of disputes escalate to wars. The likelihood of dispute escalation approaches zero after 15 disputes.

The 95% confidence interval presented by the regression becomes wider and wider as the number of disputes increases, primarily because of the distribution of the number of past disputes. Figure 4 in the Appendix shows that a plurality of disputes happens between two countries who have not disputed in the previous 10 years. The number of previous disputes

between two countries decreases (nearly) monotonically in a Pareto-like distribution.




Figure 4 - Proportion of Disputes by Number of Past Disputes

Figure 4 displays, for each dispute between two states, the number of disputes in the previous ten years between the same two states. The result is somewhat promising for our “Peaking” hypothesis, which we test using our probability regression model:

$$P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Quadratic}(\text{number of past disputes}):$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-1.11	0.017	-67.0	<2e-15***
num_disputes	-6.52	2.44	-2.67	<0.00762**
num_disputes ²	-26.4	2.93	-9.00	<2e-15***

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’

Modeling the probability of escalation using a linear probit model provides us an

insignificant relationship between the number of past disputes and the probability of escalation, with $p=.385$. Quadratically, the model fits better.

Proximity




Figure 5 - Number of Disputes and Risk of Escalation by Contiguity

39% of disputes occur between non-contiguous countries and 61% between contiguous countries. However, 51% of wars are between contiguous countries, and 49% between non-contiguous countries. The likelihood of escalation for non-contiguous countries peaks at 7 disputes, with the proportion of escalations being 28%. The mean number of disputes before escalation here is 5.16. For contiguous countries, the likelihood peaks at 11 disputes, at 15%, with the mean number of disputes before escalation being 8.0. Non-contiguous disputes are more likely to escalate overall, at 18% compared to 12%. In addition, the likelihood of escalation for disputes between non-contiguous countries drops to zero after 25 disputes, and after 32 disputes, the likelihood of escalation between contiguous countries is very low. Non-contiguous disputes

tend to escalate faster and more frequently.

Great Power Status




Figure 6 - Number of Disputes and Risk of Escalation by Power Statuses

Disputes involving great powers are more likely to escalate, and the more great powers involved, the greater the risk of escalation. 51% of all disputes are between non-great powers, 39% between a great power and a non-great power, and 10% between two great powers. The mean number of disputes before escalation between two great powers is 7.54, for a pair involving one great power it is 5.69, and for two countries that are not great powers it is 7.33. The likelihood of escalation for two non-great powers is 11% overall. For a great power/non great power pair it is 17%, and for two great powers it is 20%.

Democracy





Figure 6 - Number of Disputes and Risk of Escalation by Democracy

49% of disputes occur between a democratic/non-democratic pair, 45% between two non-democracies, and 7% between two democracies. The average number of disputes before escalation for two non-democracies is 7.0, 6.1 for a democracy and a non-democracy, and 7.7 for two democracies. The average risk of escalation is 15% for non-democratic pairs, 14% for democratic/non-democratic pairs, and 10% for democracies. The peak likelihood of escalation varies between the three, with non-democratic pairs achieving their maximum likelihood of escalation of 28% at 24 disputes, democratic/nondemocratic pairs achieving their maximum of 22% at 7 disputes, and democratic pairs achieving their maximum of 15% at 14 disputes.

Average Settlement Result



Unresolved disputes are weakly correlated with the likelihood of escalation, with a correlation of .12. Performing a linear regression, we find that the overall effect of having entirely unsettled disputes is a 9.6% increase in escalation probability, with a p-value of 2.2e-15. Dyads tend to either settle all of their disputes or none of them over the course of 10 years, which we can observe in Figure 7 in the Appendix.

Median Previous Dispute Hostility Level and Escalation

Median Hostility Level	No War	Yes War	Row Total
0	2716 0.92	246 0.08	2962 0.3
1	20 0.77	6 0.23	26 0.00
1.5	46 0.96	2 0.04	48 0.00
2	1182 0.93	92 0.07	1274 0.13
2.5	348 0.91	34 0.09	382 0.04
3	3908 0.91	410 0.09	4318 0.44
3.5	64 0.4	96 0.6	160 0.02
4	196 0.29	486 0.71	682 0.07
Column Total	8480	1372	9852

We chose not to round the median hostility level as there are a significant number of disputes (590) where the median hostility level in the previous 10 years was not a whole number. Overall, the likelihood of escalation is low (8%) for countries that have not had interstate wars in the past 10 years, but if they have (median dispute hostility = 3.5 or 4), the likelihood jumps up (to 60% and 71%, respectively). Performing a chi-squared test, these results are significant ($p < 2.2e-15$).

Model 2

$$P(\text{Escalation}) \sim \text{Quadratic}(\text{number of past disputes}) + \text{Dispute Factors}$$

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-1.76	0.042	-41	<2e-15***
num_disputes	-18.6	2.1	-9.0	<2e-15**
num_disputes ²	.49	2.3	-.22	0.827
avgset	-.32	0.060	-5.3	1.2e-6***
medhost_lvl	0.39	0.020	19	<2e-15***

We observe the curvature of the num_disputes relation changes, and that the linear term in the quadratic relationship suddenly becomes much more important than the quadratic. Using a linear model gives us similar significance.

Model 3

P(Escalation) ~ Quadratic(number of past disputes) + Dispute Factors + Structural Factors:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-1.66	0.056	-30	<2e-15***
num_disputes	-14.29	2.13	-6.7	2e-10**
num_disputes ²	.24	2.3	.105	0.91
avgset	-.37	0.061	-6.1	1e-8***
medhost_lvl	0.41	0.021	20	<2e-15***
contiguity	-0.28	0.037	-7.7	1e ⁻¹⁴ ***
dempair	-0.14	0.03	-4.75	2e ⁻⁵ ***
great_power	0.22	0.02	8.93	<2e ⁻¹⁵

The curvature of the num_disputes remains changed but barely exists, and the quadratic effect becomes smaller (as does the linear effect). Average settlement result is negatively related to the risk of escalation.

Model 4 -P(Escalation) ~ Structural factors

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z)
Intercept	-.99	0.036	-27	<2e-15***
cont	-.22	0.033	-6.5	6e-10***
dempair	-0.16	0.028	-5.7	9e-8***
great_power	0.21	0.024	8.4	<2e-15***

Discussion

A “peaking” relationship between the number of disputes and the probability of disputes would indicate that, at a certain number of disputes, the likelihood of escalation is maximized. A predictive “peaking” relationship between the number of disputes and the probability of escalation does exist, as demonstrated by model 1. However, this relationship becomes strongly negative and linear after we introduce average dispute factors and remains so after we introduce structural factors of war. We find support for the hypothesis that more disputes lower the escalation of war, and it is possible this is a result of effective signaling of resolve.

According to our models, the structural factors leading to war are all less important than incidental, dispute related factors (such as number of disputes, settlement results, and hostility levels). The ordering of the structural factors by Bremer - with contiguity being the most important, power status the second, and democracy the fifth - remains in models 3 and 4 (Bremer, 1992). However, the direction of contiguity effect flips. Instead of contiguity predicting a greater chance of war, contiguity predicts a lower likelihood of war among countries that have already disputed. This supports our theory that sending costly signals by disputing is an important aspect of demonstrating commitment. Sailing to faraway lands to dispute over something is costlier than creating aggression with neighbors, and each dispute exhausts more resources and holds more weight. The same can be said with our results regarding great power disputes, as engaging in disputes with powerful countries is very costly and risky. We explain these results not in terms of the clarity of the signal but by the fact that the cost of each dispute forces countries to make

decisions over whether they want to escalate more quickly.

The most unexpected result is the positive relationship between average dispute settlement and the probability of escalation (represented by the negative relationship between dispute unsettlement and the risk of escalation in our regressions). This result pertains to our earlier distinction about dispute recurrence and dispute escalation. Although previous research indicates that unsettled disputes are more likely to recur, the recurrence of disputes leads to a decreased chance of escalation. Since two countries that have not engaged in disputes in the first place are considered to be in settlement and a plurality of wars happen between countries that have not disputed in the past 10 years (Figure 8), an unsettled dyad - one that has likely been disputing for some time - is less likely to escalate their next dispute than a settled dyad is.

The strong relationship between the number of disputes and the risk of escalation declines after introducing structural factors. As stated previously, there is collinearity between the factors that cause disputes and the factors that cause wars - disputing is convenient when countries are close by and when those disputes are not with great powers. A large number of disputes between faraway countries signifies more than the same number between neighboring countries, where, for example, naval exercises that extend a few miles into adversarial territory would be a display of force. Second, the act of risking war itself is a powerful signal, so disputes between countries that are structurally inclined to go to war should signify more. In terms of signaling, the quality of disputes is important, although not as important as the quantity.

The analysis unit of disputes poses a limitation to the strength of our results when applied to non-disputing countries. By only observing the number and quality of previous disputes at the point of each dispute in the data set, we are not exactly comparing countries that have disputed a number of times in the previous ten years to countries that have disputed a different number of

times. Rather, at each time point, we are comparing countries that have disputed in the previous ten years *and disputed recently* to countries that have disputed in the previous ten years a different number of times *and disputed recently*. In other words, our analysis may not extend to countries that have not disputed at all. At each time point, we have not found the probability of escalation but the probability of escalation if a dispute were to happen at that moment. However, we have still found powerful results regarding nations' willingness to wage war after a series of disputes.

Future papers may consider the density of disputes within different timeframes. One can imagine a difference in terms of escalation between the rapid succession of disputes over a one-year window, and the bubbling of the same number of disputes over a ten-year window. Additionally, our paper's timeframe includes several nuclear arms races, although we do not expand on the effect of nuclear weapons development. Extending our paper to consider the development of nuclear powers might produce some fascinating intersections between our theory of resolve and nuclear deterrence theory. As the cost of war increases dramatically with nuclear weapons, it is reasonable to expect that states achieve more of their demands through militarized disputes. There are many possibilities, all of which will contribute to a better understanding of MIDs and a more peaceful future.

Appendix - Figures and Graphs




Figure 1 - The Number of Militarized Interstate Disputes per year over time




Figure 2 - Authority Trends in Pakistan

This figure is based on Polity IV resources, which can be found here: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

[org/polity/polity4.htm](https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm)




Figure 7 - Average Settlement Results in Dyads in a Ten Year Period




Figure 8 - Number of Disputes by Occurrence of War

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Tracing the Diffusion of Neoliberal Policies: A Constructivist Approach

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I. Introduction

Nowadays, *neoliberalism* and *neoliberal* are mostly used as ill-defined political anathemas. Still, it remains that these terms integrate a set of identifiable principles. It is a common belief that economically speaking, neoliberalism encourages the disappearance of state intervention while leaving the field clear for a market-based *laissez-faire*. In fact, this definition refers more to the classical notion of economic liberalism. Here, we define neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and political ideology for which the state must aim for two main goals: ensure market mechanisms and adapt society to its constantly changing global environment. To stimulate and frame free enterprise along with economic competition, the state uses institutions and legislation to organize privatizations of state-owned companies, budget cuts, financial deregulations, as well as the lowering of customs barriers and introduction of self-discipline techniques. Broadly speaking, neoliberals and the neoliberal state think that the latter should serve the free market¹. Such policies are tremendously criticized these days for their consequences regarding social inequalities. However, many states have adopted neoliberal measures since the 1980s due to globalization. What were the reasons, the inner workings, which enabled such transformations? In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that the worldwide adoption of the neoliberal model as a new universal standard was made possible thanks to its diffusion through, formal and less formal networks linking interest groups, scholars, international organizations and state leaders, and also with the help of economic or political crises.

II. Theoretical framework and method

¹ Michel Foucault, *Naissance De La Biopolitique : Cours Au Collège De France (1978-1979)*, Seuil (Paris, 2004); Barbara Stiegler, « Il Faut s'adapter ». Sur Un Nouvel Impératif Politique, Gallimard, NRF Essais (Paris, 2019).

Our hypothesis will be tested on the basis of a constructivist approach to international relations. This perspective analyses ideas and actors' identities - states, international organization, companies, NGOs, civil society groups, etc. - as key elements in international relations, and considers that the distribution of material capacities have a marginal relevance. According to constructivists, the social reality - institutions and rules - is a social construction. To them the three following premises are fundamental. First, structures can forge agents' identities. Secondly, the restrictive and organizational dimensions of these structures delimit the agents' field of interactions. Structures are intersubjective ideas, shared and *crystallized* by individuals and institutions. Thirdly, structures are plastic, day-to-day practices and actions reinforce or transform them. Constructivists think that ideas are powerful. They are structural and structuring factors, able to produce interests, identities, and norms².

More precisely, our demonstration leans on the concept of the *life cycle of norms* introduced by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink³. We, therefore, assess how neoliberalism has developed globally by tracing the process by which new norms emerge and are incorporated into the practices of international actors, which ultimately generate political changes. That type of method – process tracing - aims to get an insight into causal mechanisms, by noticing pieces of evidence and establishing recurring patterns between cases from a temporal viewpoint⁴. Even though we will not apply proper *hoop* or *smoking gun* tests, as suggested by David Collier, the hypothesis explanatory value will be reinforced by comparing constructivist analyses to other theoretical perspectives. This framework will allow us to clarify the construction, diffusion, and internalization of new neoliberal development norms, conducted by individuals, groups, and influential organizations on an international scale. Transforming in this way the interests and identities of states, as well as their leaders, representatives, and citizens. Examples involving countries from Europe, North and Latin

² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67 (Cambridge, 1999).

³ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.

⁴ David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 44, no. 4 (October 2011): 823–30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001429>.

America will support our demonstration. Such cases will help us defend the idea that networks, extending from the Mont Pelerin Society to the International Monetary Fund, in close contact with politicians and managers, made their worldview unmissable, exploiting situations of uncertainty and economic slowdowns. This paper aims to expose the strategic use of the constructed dimension of norms, by considering the circulation and legitimation of ideas as a core process to initiate international institutional changes in this era of globalization.

The first part of this paper focuses on the emergence of neoliberal ideas in Europe and North America, as well as the way promoters were able to influence politics locally and globally. The second part is dedicated to the 1970s and 1980s economic and political situations which helped the diffusion and implementation of these new development policies. Then, we discuss the internalization of these norms, in other words, the way they became self-evident truths for most people. Finally, we conclude with the worldwide adoption of neoliberal measures as the result of an active diffusion.

III. The emergence of networks and organizations promoting neoliberal policies

In this first part, we try to explain the emergence of new norms, strengthening within *epistemic communities*⁵. In our case, an epistemic community is a group of authoritative professionals and experts working in intellectual circles, think tanks, international institutions, and university departments, and driven by the same objectives of reinventing economics and promoting new kinds of political ideas⁶. We also describe how these ideas were first exported from these *production centers* to broader political and economic authorities. As our hypothesis rests partly upon the concept of globalization, let us remember first, the following definition. According to Smith, Baylis, and Owens, globalization represents “the growing interconnection process between societies, meaning that an event happening somewhere in the world, can affect people and societies

5 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 1–35.

6 Morgan Meyer and Susan Molyneux-Hodgson, “« Communautés épistémiques » : une notion utile pour théoriser les collectifs en sciences ?,” *Terrains travaux* n° 18, no. 1 (August 18, 2011): 141–54.

living on the other side of the globe”⁷. Since the end of the Second World War, this phenomenon has accelerated. In this paper, globalization is first and foremost, a powerful means of transmission for ideas, standardizing norms and practices.

Neoliberalism’s origin is often given to the journalist Walter Lippmann and his eponymous 1938’s colloquium⁸. Nevertheless, we consider that this school of thought takes on its full meaning with the Mont Pelerin Society, imagined and put in place by the German and Austrian economists Wilhelm Röpke and Friedrich Hayek. This international organization presents itself as an opponent to totalitarian regimes - Stalinism, Nazism - and ideas, to post-war Keynesianism and *embedded liberalism*. John G. Ruggie defines *embedded liberalism* as an association of free-trade and state intervention within the national economy to ensure social stability through social security and wealth redistribution⁹. However, the Society advocates for the defense of a more classical liberalism, economically and politically speaking. For instance, they promote a market society, liberalization of economies, and traditional liberal philosophical principles like the freedom of speech. Receiving funds from the United States and Switzerland, the Mont Pelerin Society was officially born in April 1947 in Vevey, Switzerland. This first meeting gathered 39 attendees, most of them being European and American scholars. They wanted to appear as an international society of thinkers whose goal was to maintain a neoliberal current “in the background”, all the while pending the right political and economic conditions to emerge, which François Denord refers to as Hayek’s *metapolitical* strategy¹⁰.

Two decades after Vevey’s meeting, these new notions were setting in throughout the US economic field, especially at the University of Chicago. The Chicago School of Economics, supported by Milton Friedman, member of the Mont Pelerin Society and laureate of the Nobel

7 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, *La Globalisation Politique Mondiale: Une Introduction Aux Relations Internationales*, Modulo Editeur (Montréal, 2011).

8 Stiegler, « Il Faut s’adapter ». Sur Un Nouvel Impératif Politique.

9 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (ed 1982): 379–415, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018993>.

10 François Denord, “Le prophète, le pèlerin et le missionnaire,” *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 145, no. 1 (2002): 9–20, <https://doi.org/10.3406/arss.2002.2794>.

Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1976, developed deep mathematical foundations, giving a strong credibility to American economic thought. Many young economists trained by Friedman were hired by assessment bodies or international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank¹¹. American universities, in which the novel economic thinking from Chicago was on the rise, took advantage of their renown to export their philosophy beyond US borders. Indeed, these universities - including those of the prestigious Ivy League - attracted a lot of international students and professors. Even back in their countries, their knowledge was frequently updated through academic stays in American universities¹². The “Chicago Boys”, Chilean economists trained at the Chicago School of Economics, are perfect examples of knowledge transfers from the United States to Latin America¹³.

Other structures, revolving around the Mont Pelerin Society and economic departments, contributed to the dissemination of neoliberal ideas. Since the 1970s, think tanks have relayed neoliberal values and policies in Europe and North America. They qualify themselves as research organizations or public policies planning institutes, claiming their independence from government cabinets and scientific institutes¹⁴. Yet, they benefit from private companies’ financings and work with analysts connected to political and administrative places of power. Their reports and studies are mostly intended for businesses or political parties¹⁵. According to sociologist Thomas Mevdtetz, these think tanks are *interstitial fields*. That is to say, they are organizational structures where political, academic, media, and business authorities meet. In short, the structures that we discussed above, in which epistemic communities incarnate themselves, act like interfaces where

11 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, “Le ‘Washington Consensus,’” *Actes de La Recherche En Sciences Sociales*, March 1998, 3–22.

12 Yves Dezalay, “Les courtiers de l’international,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* n° 151-152, no. 1 (2004): 4–35.

13 Franck Gaudichaud, “La voie chilienne au néolibéralisme. Regards croisés sur un pays laboratoire,” *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, June 10, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.67029>.

14 Thomas Mevdtetz, “10. Terra Obscura : Vers Une Théorie Des Think Tanks Américains,” in *Aux Frontières de l’expertise : Dialogues Entre Savoirs et Pouvoirs*, ed. Yann Bérard and Renaud Crespin, Res Publica (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015), 177–95, <http://books.openedition.org/pur/9945>.

15 Julien Weisbein and Samuel Hayat, *Introduction à la socio-histoire des idées politiques* (Louvain-La-Neuve: De Boeck Supérieur, 2020).

agents can move between the *production centers* of neoliberal thinking and institutions or states.

IV. The catalytic power of crises

We will now study what Finnemore and Sikkink call the institutionalization of new norms in “specific rules and international organizations”¹⁶ while also exploring their diffusion mechanisms. Research shows that implementing neoliberal reforms became possible while states were dealing with the 1970s and 1980s global economic and political uncertainties, giving Hayek’s *metapolitical* strategy a truly prophetic aspect. Using both international diffusion networks and what we called the *production centers* of neoliberal thinking, *norms entrepreneurs*¹⁷ have been able to exploit these critical situations. Such an assumption echoes Naomi Klein’s “shock doctrine”, which she describes in her 2007’s book¹⁸. The United States’ abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, which had protected global economic stability and the liberal order since 1944, gave way to a new phase of uncooperativeness. This situation resulted in increasing oil prices decided by oil-producing countries, leading to both the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. This sequence of crises, high inflation rates, declining growth, and profit rates in Europe and North America, coupled with equally disastrous debt crises in South American countries, set the perfect stage for new neoliberal state politics¹⁹.

Yet, the constructivist analysis does not offer a full description of what made the context opportune to “open the window” for neoliberal reforms²⁰. Authors of liberal inspiration highlight that, internal factors, such as democratic pressure, played a part in the rise to power of neoliberal leaders. United Kingdom’s prime minister James Callaghan and the Labour Party faced waves of trade union strikes, from 1978 to 1979. This “Winter of Discontent” originated from poor inflation

16 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”

17 Jonathan Swartz, *Constructing Neoliberalism*, University of Toronto Press (Toronto, 2013), https://utoronto-press.com/us/constructing-neoliberalism-3?__SID=U.

18 Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*, Metropolitan Books (New York, 2007).

19 Mark Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087230>.

20 John T. S. Keeler, “Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” *Comparative Political Studies* 25, no. 4 (January 1, 1993): 433–86, <https://doi.org/10.1177/001041409302500402>.

management and unsatisfying pay raises promised by the left-wing government. On the other side of the Atlantic, the American “misery index” - an indicator linking unemployment with inflation - was at its highest since the great depression. President Jimmy Carter – and Democrats – had been discredited for his softness, his lack of economic control, and the humiliating hostage-taking in Teheran’s US embassy from 1979 to 1981. The United States experienced a conservative turning point during this period, leaving the field free for Reagan and his promise of “New Beginnings”. Thatcher took advantage of an impossible social peace recovery and became prime minister in 1979²¹.

Those crises stimulated critics against Keynesianism. Both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were calling for the end of *welfarism*, state-owned companies, and all sorts of regulations²². Think tanks like the Institute of Economic Affairs in Great Britain exercised a significant influence on the ideological stance of these political leaders. Elsewhere in western Europe, forums gathered economists to discuss public policies. Those meetings were good opportunities for American economists – affiliated with the Chicago School of Economics - to expand the neoliberal epistemic community. Their growing influence was noticeable in scientific fields as well as in states apparatuses and think tanks close to conservative political parties²³. Once again, liberal thinkers provide a slightly different analysis. Stimulation (Keynesian) policies were unable to reverse the stagflation and then the inflation. This brought the *embedded liberalism* model to disrepute in France and Great Britain. Public finance crises even forced the IMF - whose goal is to control its members’ account balances - to take action in 1976 in Great Britain, 1977 in Italy, and to threaten France to be put under supervision in 1983²⁴.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the IMF changed its function to avoid a global financial

21 Keeler, 28–31.

22 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, “10. Le grand tournant,” in *La nouvelle raison du monde*, La Découverte (Paris: La Découverte, 2010), 273–327, <https://www.cairn.info/la-nouvelle-raison-du-monde--9782707165022-page-273.htm>.

23 Bruno Jobert, *Le tournant neo-liberal en Europe*, L’Harmattan (Paris, 1994).

24 Laurent Warlouzet, “Conclusion,” in *Calmer Les Prix: L’inflation En Europe Dans Les Années 1970 / Slowing down Prices ; European Inflation in the 1970s*, Presses de Sciences Po, Mission Historique de La Banque de France (Colloquium on the inflationary pressure in the European 1970s and its consequences, Paris, 2016).

crisis related to unpaid national debts. It became an organization focused on giving financial and technical assistance to developing countries, in exchange for the implementation of structural adjustment plans²⁵. This shift appeared at the same time as the institution’s internal transformation²⁶, following the employment of orthodox economists²⁷. The creation of what we call the “Washington Consensus”²⁸, has been central in the adoption of neoliberal development policies in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. This “Washington Consensus” encompasses several measures prescribed by Washington’s authorities - including the IMF and the World Bank. In order to obtain financial help, it was mandatory for indebted southern states to institute such measures, including budgetary discipline, diminution of public expenses, strict inflation rate control, drastic fiscal adjustments in favor of foreign capital, financial and commercial liberalization, privatizations, and protection of intellectual property²⁹.

On the other hand, Marxists and neo-Gramscians like Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton describe the in-depth work provided by the “axis of influence” – international economic institutions – to guarantee the preservation of capital. Its position ensures the connection between the world economy and government bodies. Globalized production and transnationalization of labor/capital ratio of power thrust the internationalization of states. In this perspective, the “axis” leans on this transformation of central and peripheral states to turn them into actual “transmission belts” for the neoliberal ideology and the logic of local and global capital competition³⁰.

However, South America’s transition to neoliberalism was not truly uniform. Chili appeared

25 Ngaire Woods, “L’économie Politique Internationale à l’ère de La Globalisation,” in *La Globalisation Politique Mondiale: Une Introduction Aux Relations Internationales*, Modulo Editeur (Montréal, 2011), 603.

26 Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization*, Princeton University Press (Princeton University Press, 2009).

27 Dezalay and Garth, “Le ‘Washington Consensus.’”

28 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened ?*, What Washington Means by Policy Reform (Washington, 1990).

29 Gaudichaud, “La voie chilienne au néolibéralisme. Regards croisés sur un pays laboratoire.”

30 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” *Capital & Class* 28, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 85–113, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030981680408200106>; Robert W. Cox, “Global Perestroika (1992),” in *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge, 1996), 296–314, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607905.016>.

to be the laboratory and starting point of this transformation. From 1974, Pinochet's dictatorship imposed the "Chicago Boys" dogmas by force. This event shows that a conservative revolution, neoliberalism, and authoritarianism can get along well³¹. By contrast, Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur point out that, by the end of the 1970s, neighboring countries, introduced neoliberal policies while dealing with debt crises and transitioning towards democracy³². Notice that, even if most of the time, the consensus was exported through Washington's local intermediaries, a lot could be explained by an imitation process³³.

V. **The adoption and internalization of a new paradigm**

In this last part, we demonstrate that the third phase of Finnemore and Sikkink's *life cycle of norms* reinforces our hypothesis. Norms are internalized when they appear as obvious rules that nobody questions. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas and Sarah L. Babb argue that the neoliberal framework took advantage of globalization and the emergence of a global financial order delimiting the spectrum of feasible policies. Moreover, adjustments to local defining features through the fusion with national ideals helped that transition process³⁴. Thatcher mentioned these political transformations in terms of "deep-rooted liberal instincts", whereas Mitterand claimed that they were in harmony with France's "idéal républicain"³⁵. In the same vein, Johnathan Swarts observes adaptable transitions in other Anglo-Saxon countries notably Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which suited each politico-economic context. Norms entrepreneurs used similar expressions like *rationality* or *inevitability* in many shapes and forms³⁶. Each time, these words were accompanying

31 Martin Beddeleem and Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger, "L'héritage conservateur du néolibéralisme," *Philosophie, histoire des idées, pensée politique*, no. 23 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.4000/asterion.5452>; Ruth Levitas, *The Ideology of the New Right*, Polity Press (Oxford, 1986).

32 Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, "The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2005, 102–24.

33 Kurt Weyland, "Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform," *World Politics* 57, no. 2 (2005): 262–95.

34 Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas and Sarah L Babb, "The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries," *American Journal of Sociology*, 2002, 47; Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner, and Mauro F. Guillén, "The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999," *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 6 (December 1, 2005): 871–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240507000601>.

35 Jobert, *Le tournant neo-liberal en Europe*.

36 Swarts, *Constructing Neoliberalism*.

a typical coercive rhetoric of crisis. According to Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, slogans disapproving of Keynesian politics such as "companies are overtaxed, over-regulated, overexposed to trade unions, egotistic corporations, and civil servants pressures", went hand in hand with the introduction of this new political rationale³⁷.

We noticed earlier the simultaneity of the liberalization and democratization processes in many South American states³⁸. Meanwhile, the internalization of the "Washington Consensus" in these states was assisted by a sort of an "educational process", from international organizations and their agents towards decision-makers and citizens³⁹, to the point where people were convinced that "there was no alternative". The Argentinian economist Domingo Cavallo is a good example. He is a former 1970's Harvard student who spent time at the World Bank and founded the "Fundación Mediterranea" think tank. Cavallo taught economics to Carlos Menem – President of Argentina from 1989 to 1999 - and then became his Minister of Economy. He is also the creator of the Argentinian structural adjustment plan, known as the "convertibility plan"⁴⁰. This stereotypical case illustrates how epistemic communities can change the way leaders think, and by extension their identities and interests⁴¹. Nonetheless, Bessma Momani's work qualifies this first approach. She says that the "learner" position of the IMF member-states is not self-evident. Her paper shows that, even if Canadian officials respect the pieces of advice and analyses given by the IMF, it does not necessarily mean that they convert its recommendations into laws⁴². Her demonstration echoes

37 Dardot and Laval, "10. Le grand tournant."

38 Jordana and Levi-Faur, "The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order."

39 Covadonga Meseguer, "Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 598, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): 67–82, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716204272372>; Marc Hufty, "Argentine : Un Gouvernement Sous Influence," in *L'économie à La Recherche Du Développement : Crise d'une Théorie, Violence d'une Pratique*, ed. Christian Comelieu, Cahiers de l'IUED (Genève: Graduate Institute Publications, 2016), 113–31, <http://books.openedition.org/iheid/2818>.

40 Hufty, "Argentine."

41 Emmanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground:: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 319–63, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003>.

42 Bessma Momani, "Assessing the Utility of, and Measuring Learning from, Canada's IMF Article IV Consultations," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 39, no. 2 (2006): 249–69.

what we saw earlier. It is necessary, for these lessons to be assimilated, to consider the local/national circumstances. In doing so, she criticizes the hypothesis leaning on “learning models” suggested by Finnemore and Barnett⁴³.

Finally, we see that the neoliberal state and the internalization of its governance emerged from the combination of political, professional, and business world’s interests. Such a fusion produces the integration of knowledge, powers, and networks⁴⁴. For his part, Mark Blyth thinks that each neoliberal institutional overhaul incorporated new types of political configurations. They were brought by interest groups and actors who capitalized off of the Keynesian consensus *disembedding* following the European and North American crises⁴⁵.

Nonetheless, the constructivist reading that has been employed thus far calls for a counterbalance. For the liberal authors, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye the transformation of the state was driven by the expansion of global capitalism and transnational organizations. This led to a growing interdependence between states, firms, and international organizations, cemented by global finance. This “international pluralism” ties together national groups of interest on a transnational scale. We also witness a developing asymmetrical influence among states, as well as the rise of actors like multinational corporations, which are more and more autonomous and sizable politically speaking. On a way out of the crisis, we can imagine that states, helped by the IMF or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), could set up cooperation mechanisms and agree to adopt common economic reforms. For Keohane and Nye, actors accept – but do not necessarily control - these transformations as a result of a spillover effect caused by the evolving liberal order. Therefore, people and institutions end up taking reforms, which are supposedly preserving and improving the national and global free market, for granted⁴⁶.

43 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999): 699–732.

44 Michael I. Reed, “Elites, Professions, and the Neoliberal State: Critical Points of Intersection and Contention,” *Journal of Professions and Organization* 5, no. 3 (October 1, 2018): 297–312, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jpo/joy010>.

45 Blyth, *Great Transformations*.

46 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 329–49; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord*

At last, Dardot and Laval based on Foucault’s work, picture the internalization of neoliberal ideology as the result of a centripetal dynamic. They think that the neoliberal project, elaborated itself in the heart of a raging conflict against the welfare state, involving intellectual, professional, social, and political forces. This conflict was a meeting place and a catalyst for these forces, which were scattered up to that point. This dynamic resulted in the simultaneous implementation of “technics of power” and “apparatuses of discipline”, which modified individual behaviors and imposed a “new regime of evidence”⁴⁷.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we showed that neoliberal economic development plans spread and implemented themselves globally following the Finnemore and Sikkink’s *life cycle of norms* process. The new economic thinking appeared within epistemic communities incarnated by structures like the Mont Pelerin Society and prestigious university departments such as the Chicago School of Economics. Their openings on political and economic nexuses of power as well as the circulation of agents who “spread the word”⁴⁸, gave birth to a global network. Then crises and disruptions helped to assimilate and legitimate these new ideas. Ultimately, thanks to *education* the internalization succeeded, but also because different groups of people found in neoliberal policies, a new shared “unsurpassable horizon”. This same dissemination and consolidation process is well-illustrated in Rajat Gupta’s words – former CEO of consulting firm McKinsey – about his own company: “a banyan tree which ramifications root deeply from its branches, in a way that they do not rely on the original trunk anymore. In turn, they can produce similar branches allowing the banyan to spread wider and wider.”⁴⁹

Regardless, constructivists do not claim that changes in world politics are as easy as some caricaturists may say. Structures are powerful, they are the results of day-to-day practices. Actors

in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1984).

47 Dardot and Laval, “10. Le grand tournant”; Foucault, *Naissance De La Biopolitique : Cours Au Collège De France (1978-1979)*.

48 Hufty, “Argentine.”

49 Marie-Laure Djelic, “L’arbre banian de la mondialisation,” *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* n° 151-152, no. 1 (2004): 107–13.

produce and reproduce them constantly⁵⁰. Changes appear through substantive work and/or in timely situations. Nonetheless, our constructivist analysis suffers from several blind spots. We focused exclusively on three geographic areas, Europe, North American, and Latin America, and ignored the Cold War and post-Cold War contexts. Finally, our hypothesis depicts states as passive agents and neglects their interests and struggles for relative gains. Realists tend to give way more importance to those factors.

⁵⁰ Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267>.

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